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MULTIPLE CHANCELLORS:
REFORMING THE NATIONAL INJUNCTION
Samuel L. Bray*
In several recent high-profile cases, federal district judges have issued injunctions that
apply across the nation, controlling the defendants' behavior with respect to nonparties.
This Article analyzes the scope of injunctions to restrain the enforcement of a federal
statute, regulation, or order. This analysis shows the consequences of the national
injunction: more forum shopping, worse judicial decisionmaking, a risk of conflicting
injunctions, and tension with other doctrines and practices of the federal courts.
This Article shows that the national injunction is a recent development in the history of
equity. There was a structural shift at the Founding from a single-chancellor model to a
multiple-chancellor model, but the vulnerabilities in the latter did not become visible until
the mid- to late twentieth century, when there were changes in how judges thought about
legal challenges and invalid laws. Only with those changes - only in the second half of
the twentieth century - did the national injunction emerge.
This Article proposes a single clear rule for the scope of injunctions against federal
defendants. A federal court should give what might be called a "plaintiff-protective
injunction," enjoining the defendant's conduct only with respect to the plaintiff No
matter how important the question and no matter how important the value of uniformity,
a federal court should not award a national injunction. This rule is based on equitable
principles and on the scope of the "judicial Power" granted by the Constitution of the
United States.
INTRODUCTION
F ederal district judges have taken to an odd practice: they are issuinginjunctions that apply across the nation, controlling the defendant's
behavior with respect to nonparties. A prominent example is the pre-
liminary injunction in Texas v. United States,' which shut down the
implementation of the Obama Administration's most important immi-
gration program.2 Another is the preliminary injunction in Washington
* Professor, UCLA School of Law. The writing of this Article was supported by a Harrington
Faculty Fellowship at the University of Texas at Austin. For comments and criticisms on earlier
drafts, I am grateful to William Baude, Josh Blackman, Bob Bone, Maureen Carroll, Nathan
Chapman, Kevin Clermont, Kristen Eichensehr, Richard Fallon, Ranjit Hakim, Andy Hessick,
Andrew Kull, Douglas Laycock, Marty Lederman, Michael Morley, Nicholas Parillo, Richard Re,
Doug Rendleman, Bertrall Ross, Stephen E. Sachs, Eugene Volokh, Kevin Walsh, Patrick Wooley,
Stephen Yeazell, and the participants in law faculty workshops at Notre Dame and the University
of Texas at Austin. For helpful conversations and correspondence, I am grateful to Ronen Avraham,
Aaron-Andrew Bruhl, Jud Campbell, Perry Dane, John Duffy, Ward Farnsworth, John Golden,
Michael McConnell, Susan Morse, John Nagle, Andrew Pincus, Jeffrey Pojanowski, Zachary Price,
Larry Sager, David Waddilove, Christopher Walker, and Howard Wasserman. I also thank Lei
Zhang for his excellent research support and archival sleuthing.
1 Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex.), aff'd, 80g F 3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff'd




v. Trump,3 which halted the implementation of President Trump's
first executive order restricting entry by individuals from seven coun-
tries.4  How did this practice of issuing national injunctions begin? Is
it defensible?
This Article offers a new analysis of the scope of injunctions to re-
strain the enforcement of a federal statute, regulation, or order. Without
much controversy, federal courts have increasingly been acting as if they
have the authority to issue "national injunctions."' That is, in non--class
actions, federal courts are issuing injunctions that are universal in
scope - injunctions that prohibit the enforcement of a federal statute,
regulation, or order not only against the plaintiff, but also against any-
one. There is a small but growing literature critical of the national in-
junction.6 The criticisms expressed in this literature are essentially cor-
rect, including that the national injunction encourages forum shopping
and that it arrests the development of the law in the federal system. But
there is a strange disconnect between the diagnosis and the cure. The
solutions proposed in this literature rely heavily on existing principles
and appeals to judicial self-restraint. If these solutions would work,
they would already have worked.
3 Washington v. Trump, No. CI7-oI 4 1, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) (granting
temporary restraining order).
4 See id. The challenged executive order was subsequently replaced. The second order was
the subject of national injunctions, which were stayed in part by the Supreme Court, see Trump v.
Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087-89 (2017) (per curiam), and later vacated
and remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot, Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 2017
WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017) (mem.) (per curiam). The third order was also the subject of
national injunctions. See Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17-00050, 2017 WL 4639560, at *14 (D. Haw. Oct.
17, 2017) (granting temporary restraining order), appeal docketed, No. 17-17168 (gth Cir. Oct. 24,
2017); Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, No. 17-0361, 2017 WL 4674314, at *40-41 (D.
Md. Oct. 17, 2017). The litigation is continuing.
5 No term is perfect. "Nationwide injunction" is especially inapt, because it emphasizes terri-
torial breadth, when the real point of distinction is that the injunction protects nonparties. See
infra note i9. "Universal injunction" is better, though it does not include the distinctive fact that
these injunctions constrain the national government, as opposed to state governments. See infra
note 29 and accompanying text.
6 See Michael T Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 2 3 (B)(2), and the Remedial Powers of the
Lower Courts, 97 B.U. L. REv. 615 (2017); Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff- and
Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other Constitutional Cases, 39
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 487 (2056) [hereinafter Morley, De Facto Class Actions?]; Zayn Siddique,
Nationwide Injunctions, 118 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2oi8) (originally available as an online
draft in 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2801387 [https://perma.cc/NXL8-KSDM] Getzel Berger, Note,
Nationwide Injunctions Against the Federal Government: A Structural Approach, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1068 (2017); Daniel J. Walker, Note, Administrative Injunctions: Assessing the Propriety of Non-Class
Collective Relief, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1119 (2005); see also Maureen Carroll, Aggregation for Me, but
Not for Thee: The Rise of Common Claims in Non-Class Litigation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2017, 2030-
34 (2015). Professor Douglas Laycock has questioned the use of injunctions that run beyond the plain-
tiffs. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 275-76 (4 th ed. 2oo); Thomas C.
Berg & Douglas Laycock, Protecting Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty, in RELIGION AND
EQUALITY: LAW IN CONFLICT 167, 172 n.25 (W. Cole Durham Jr. & Donlu Thayer eds., 2016).
2017]1 419
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
This Article shows how we got here, and where we should go. Its
primary contributions, in other words, are two.
First, it offers a new understanding of the causes of the current prob-
lem. It shows that the national injunction is a recent development in
the history of equity, traceable to the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury. The older English and American practice was that an injunction
would restrain the defendant's conduct vis-h-vis the plaintiff, not vis-h-
vis the world.' Thus, judicial behavior about the scope of injunctions
has changed. But more has changed than judicial behavior.
If the English Chancellor had given national injunctions, they would
not have been particularly problematic.8 There would have been no
forum shopping and no risk of conflicting injunctions issued to the same
defendant. The reason is a structural feature of English equity: there
was one Chancellor." By contrast, in the federal courts of the United
States, every judge is a "Chancellor" in the sense of having power to
issue equitable relief. The current problems from the national injunc-
tion are thus a result of two transformations. One involved judicial
institutions (the number of Chancellors). That transformation was a
necessary precondition for the second, which involved judicial behavior
(the scope of relief granted). The multiple-chancellor model of the fed-
eral courts requires better behavior from judges about the scope of eq-
uitable relief, behavior we can no longer count on.
Second, this Article proposes a single clear rule for the scope of in-
junctions against federal defendants. A federal court should give a
plaintiff-protective injunction, enjoining the defendant's conduct only
with respect to the plaintiff.' 0 No matter how important the question
and no matter how important the value of uniformity, a federal court
should not award a national injunction. This rule, if adopted by the
courts or by Congress, would alleviate the forum-shopping problem. It
would restore the percolation of legal questions through different courts
of appeals, allowing each circuit to reach its own conclusion pending
resolution by the Supreme Court. And it would nearly eliminate the
risk of directly conflicting injunctions.
7 The exceptions, including in rem suits, do not offer a basis for national injunctions. An in-
junction could control the defendant's conduct outside the court's territorial jurisdiction, but it
would do so to protect the plaintiff, not to protect nonparties.
8 The injunction is an equitable remedy, developed primarily in the English Court of Chancery.
For a sketch of the history of equity, see J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 97-116 (4 th ed. 2002).
9 That is, Chancery was an essentially unitary institution. For further discussion and qualifi-
cation of the point that there was one Chancellor, see infra section IIA, pp. 446-48.
10 A similar rule has been suggested by Laycock: "[Tihe court in an individual action should not
globally prohibit a government agency from enforcing an invalid regulation; the court should order
only that the invalid regulation not be enforced against the individual plaintiff." LAYCOCK, supra
note 6, at 276.
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This rule is rooted in the authority of the federal courts. Article III
gives the federal courts the "judicial Power,""' which is a power to de-
cide cases for parties, not questions for everyone.12 A further source of
this rule is equitable principles. The federal courts are obligated to trace
their equitable doctrines and remedies to the historic tradition of eq-
uity.' 3 In equity, however, injunctions did not control the defendant's
behavior against nonparties. It is true that traditional equity lacked
the sharply defined rule that is advanced here: because there was one
Chancellor, Chancery never needed to develop rules to constrain the
scope of injunctive relief. But translating traditional equity into the
present, with sensitivity to the changed institutional setting, requires this
rule.
The central objection to the proposal here is that it will lead to dis-
uniformity in the law. That disuniformity will be of two kinds. First,
if an injunction protects only the plaintiff, the federal government may
continue to apply the invalidated statute, regulation, or order to other
people. Second, once the disuniformity within a circuit is ended, usually
but not always by a holding from the court of appeals, the federal gov-
ernment may continue enforcement in other circuits.
Is the bitter worth the sweet? Our system already tolerates a sub-
stantial amount of legal disuniformity. Without a decision by the
Supreme Court, state courts and lower federal courts can reach different
conclusions on the same question.14 The national government is not
subject to offensive issue preclusion in later suits with different parties.15
When federal agencies lose in one circuit, they often continue litigating
the question in other circuits.'6
If this seems like madness, it has a method. If the circuits all agree,
their precedents resolve the question; if they disagree, the Supreme
Court gains from the clash of opposing views. We sacrifice immediate
11 U.S. CONST. art. III, § I.
12 See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 132 (20II); Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343, 349 (1996).
13 See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318-29 ('999).
Grupo Mexicano has been criticized. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet:
Tradition, History, and Limitations on Federal Judicial Power - A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1291 (2000); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and
Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223 (2003). Nevertheless, its emphasis on traditional equity has ample
precedent, see John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV.
113, 126-30 (1998), and has been reiterated in subsequent cases, see Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme
Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997 (2015).
14 See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 58 ni1 (1997); Lockhart v.
Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 375-76 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[N]either federal supremacy nor
any other principle of federal law requires that a state court's interpretation of federal law give way
to a (lower) federal court's interpretation." Id. at 376.).
15 See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158-64 (1984).
16 See generally Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Adminis-
trative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989).
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resolution for what we hope will be better decisionmaking.17 The na-
tional injunction requires the opposite sacrifice, giving up deliberate de-
cisionmaking for accelerated resolution. Cases still go to the Supreme
Court, but without the benefit of decisions from multiple courts of ap-
peals. If the national injunction issued by the district court is a prelim-
inary one, the Supreme Court might even decide a major constitutional
question on a motion for a stay. In that procedural posture, the Court
would be reviewing lower court decisions reached in haste, and without
the benefit of a record. Indeed, that very nearly occurred with the Take
Care Clause claim in Texas v. United States, and with important ques-
tions about executive power and religious freedom in challenges to the
immigration orders of President Trump.1s By returning to the older
practice with respect to the scope of injunctions - the practice that ob-
tained for more than a century and a half in the federal courts, and that
is still followed in many cases - we choose patience and get better de-
cisions. Measure twice, cut once.
The proposal made here differs sharply from the solutions proposed
by most commentators. The limiting principles they have suggested in-
clude the physical boundaries of the court's jurisdiction,1 9 whether a
broad injunction is necessary to provide "complete relief,"2 0 whether
"the court believes the underlying right to be highly significant,"2 1
whether the challenge is to "a generally applicable policy or practice
maintained by a defendant,"2 2 and whether "the challenged provision
17 But cf. Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, i J. LEGAL ANALYSIS I
(2009) (noting recurring problems with many-minds arguments).
18 On the possibility that the outcome of National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), would have been different if it had been decided on a motion to stay
a preliminary injunction, see infra note 259.
19 See Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 6, at 535-38, 554; Berger, supra note 6, at
1oo-04; see also Siddique, supra note 6 (manuscript at 6) (treating the relevant question as "the
geographic scope of injunctions"). Such a solution has no basis in traditional equity. On the one
hand, equity confined itself to controlling the defendant's behavior vis-h-vis the plaintiff. On
the other hand, to protect the plaintiff, equity was willing to enjoin acts committed outside of the
Chancellor's territorial jurisdiction. Equity acts in personam. Geographical lines are simply not
the stopping point. See sources cited infra note 320; see also Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 888, 890-91 (3d Cir.), aff'd on reh'g, 809 F2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986) (reversing
injunction that controlled federal defendants' behavior within the District of New Jersey, in favor
of an injunction controlling their behavior only against the plaintiff).
20 Siddique, supra note 6 (manuscript at 39-45).
21 Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 879 (7th Cir. 20II) (Posner, J.)
(quoting i DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.4(6), at 113 (2d ed. 1993)). Zamecnik addressed
the scope of an injunction, and though it did not involve a national injunction, it has been cited in
support of national injunctions. See City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17 C 5720, 2017 WL 4 5 722o8,
at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2017).
22 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04 cmt. a, at 117-19 (AM.
LAW INST. 2010); see also Walker, supra note 6, at 1141 ("If a plaintiff successfully challenges a rule
of 'broad applicability,' then the relief, the invalidation of the rule, will naturally extend to persons
beyond the named plaintiffs.").
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can coherently be applied just to people other than the plaintiffs." 23
These approaches and proposals are all indeterminate. Some are
question-begging, such as allowing national injunctions only against
generally applicable policies. Some are even perverse, such as allowing
national injunctions only in the most significant cases - a principle that
would allow national injunctions only when the forum-shopping temp-
tation is irresistible. They also tend to exhort judges to apply the exist-
ing principles in a restrained way. But if the rise of the national injunc-
tion was not due to willful judging - if it was latent in the structure of
the federal courts and then manifested with changes in ideology24 -
then we must look elsewhere for the answer. Exhortation is not a solu-
tion to structural problems and ideological forces.
For the rule proposed here, the historical account of the origins of
the national injunction is not mere background. The equitable doctrines
and remedies of the federal courts must have a basis in traditional eq-
uity.2 5 The national injunction lacks the requisite basis. Moreover, this
account exposes a complexity that scholars and courts need to consider
when asking what is part of traditional equity. It is not enough to look
at the past to see if some contemporary phenomenon can be spotted
there, as if it were a beast in the wild. One must also consider the
institutional setting - the one-chancellor setting - in which traditional
equitable doctrines were fashioned. In that setting, certain powers and
limits were developed. Other powers and limits were not developed,
because there was no occasion for them. But we live in a multiple-
chancellor world. Given the gap between equity's past and present,
sometimes a translation has to be made.26 Sometimes equity's principles
have to change in order to stay the same.
In this Article, the assumption is that each case discussed is right on
the merits; the analysis is about what the court's remedial response
should have been. Without this assumption, the problem of national
injunctions is intractable. It would be easy for a legal scholar, con-
sciously or unconsciously, to think that a "sound" decision on the merits
should be paired with a national injunction, while an "unsound" deci-
sion should be enforced with an injunction protecting only the plaintiff.
But the injunction choice is made by the very same judge who decides
the merits. The scope of the equitable remedy must be disentangled
from the correctness of a particular merits decision.
23 Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 6, at 495-96.
24 Throughout this Article "ideological" is used to refer to intellectual shifts in thinking about
law and the nature of the judicial role.
25 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
26 See Samuel L. Bray, Form and Substance in the Fusion ofLaw and Equity, in EQUITY AND
LAW: FUSION AND FISSION (John Goldberg, Henry Smith & Peter Turner eds., forthcoming 2018).
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This analysis considers injunctions that federal courts issue against
federal defendants. This inquiry has complications enough without con-
sidering other kinds of cases. Even so, the analysis can apply more
broadly. First, in suits between private parties, it is already the case
that the practice of the federal courts is generally aligned with the sug-
gestions in this Article. 2 7 Second, the rule advanced here would logically
apply whenever federal courts enjoin state defendants.28 That is, federal
courts should issue injunctions that control a state defendant's conduct
vis-a-vis the plaintiff, not vis-h-vis nonparties.2 9 Finally, the analysis
here could be extended to injunctions issued by state courts. Whether
it should be, however, depends on a state's preference either for speedy
resolution of legal questions or for an accumulation of multiple judicial
opinions (in hope of epistemic advantages).
The argument proceeds as follows. Part I describes the origins of
the national injunction, showing its absence from traditional equity and
its emergence in the second half of the twentieth century. Part II con-
siders the question of what changed. It highlights two shifts in how
judges viewed challenges to invalid laws. Part III describes the conse-
quences of the national injunction: forum shopping, worse decisionmak-
ing, a risk of conflicting injunctions, and tension with other doctrines
and practices of the federal courts. Part IV shows the failure of what,
in existing law, is the primary constraint on national injunctions, namely,
the "complete relief" principle. Finally, Part V proposes a simple rule:
federal courts should issue injunctions that control a federal defendant's
conduct only with respect to the plaintiff. If adopted, this rule will keep
one Chancellor's foot from stepping on another Chancellor's toes.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL INJUNCTION
Whenever the court's holding is that a federal statute, regulation, or
order is unlawful, the court must decide the scope of the remedy. One
27 For example, when one company is enjoined from using another's patent, even though the
territorial scope of the injunction may be universal, the injunction does not prohibit the defendant
from infringing the patents of other patent holders. Rather, it protects only the plaintiff, and only
against an almost exact repetition of the previous infringement. See John M. Golden, Injunctions
as More (or Less) Than "Off Switches". Patent-Infringement Injunctions' Scope, go TEX. L. REV.
1399 (2012). There are exceptions, such as some Title VII suits.
28 Municipalities have long been subject to broader equitable relief. See infra notes 68-69 and
accompanying text.
29 There are pragmatic reasons for distinguishing federal defendants from state defendants. Be-
cause a state government is within only one federal court of appeals, plaintiffs suing state defend-
ants have less incentive to forum shop. (It may also be easier to engage in forum shopping against
federal defendants because of broad venue rules.) For the same reason, there is less risk of conflict-
ing injunctions from different courts. The fact that a state government is within only one federal
court of appeals also makes it somewhat less likely that a federal circuit split will develop about the
meaning of a state law.
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of the available remedies is the injunction, which requires the defendant
to do or refrain from doing some act. The injunction is a "national
injunction" when it controls the federal defendant's conduct against ev-
eryone, not just against the plaintiff.
The equitable doctrines and remedies of the federal courts must find
some warrant in the traditional practice of equity, especially as it existed
in the Court of Chancery in 1789.30 This Part shows the absence of the
national injunction from traditional equity, and locates the origin of the
national injunction in the second half of the twentieth century.
A. The Absence of the National Injunction from Traditional Equity
There is an easy, uncomplicated answer to the question whether the
national injunction is traceable to traditional equity: no.
In English equity before the Founding of the United States, there
were no injunctions against he Crown. No doubt part of the explana-
tion was the identification of the Chancellor with the King, an
identification that was important in the early development and self-
understanding of the Court of Chancery.3  Without injunctions against
the Crown, it would be easy to see why there were no broad injunctions
against the enforcement of statutes.3 2  There were sometimes suits
to restrain the actions of particular officers against particular plain-
tiffs.3 3 And the Attorney General could be a defendant in Chancery in
certain kinds of cases "in which the interests of the Crown" were not
"immediately concerned."34 Still, there was nothing remotely like a na-
tional injunction.
Equity would sometimes resolve a number of claims at once. To get
into equity, a plaintiff needed to show that his case fit under one of the
heads of equitable jurisdiction. One of these, "multiplicity of suits,"
could be invoked when the equity plaintiff wanted to avoid repeated
30 See, e.g., Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318-19
(1999).
31 J.D. HEYDON, M.J. LEEMING & P.G. TURNER, MEAGHER, GUMMow & LEHANE'S EQ-
UITY: DOCTRINES AND REMEDIES § 21-5lo, at 787 (5th ed. 2015) ("Under the general law the
Court of Chancery had no jurisdiction to issue injunctions against the Crown, since the court was
itself an emanation of the Crown.").
32 Cf LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 466 & n.31 (1965)
("English history is sparse and obscure with respect to bills in equity by taxpayer or citizen." Id. at
466.). A similar point could be made about the prerogative writs. See id. at 462 ("The prerogative
writs, in their origin and until the middle of the Nineteenth Century, were used primarily to control
authorities below the level of the central government. The King and his ministers were controlled,
if at all, by Parliament.').
33 HEYDON, LEEMING & TURNER, supra note 31, § 21-510, at 787.
34 1 EDMUND ROBERT DANIELL, THE PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY




instances of litigation with the same opposing party (for example, re-
peated trespass).3 5
In addition, to avoid a multiplicity of suits, equity would give a "bill
of peace." 3 6 With this device, the Chancellor would consolidate a num-
ber of suits that would not be sequential between two parties. These
might be suits involving some kind of common claim the plaintiff could
have against multiple defendants (for example, a lord suing all of his
tenants, or a vicar suing all of his parishioners). Or these might be suits
involving some kind of common claim that multiple plaintiffs could
have against a single defendant (for example, the tenants suing the lord,
or the parishioners suing the vicar).37
A bill of peace with multiple plaintiffs who represented the whole
set of possible plaintiffs - some tenants representing all of the tenants,
or some parishioners representing all of the parishioners - is probably
the closest analogy in traditional equity to the national injunction. The
analogy is not close. A bill of peace was not used to resolve a question
of legal interpretation for the entire realm. It was not enough that many
people were interested in or affected by the outcome. It was instead a
kind of proto-class action. The group was small and cohesive; in pre-
sent terms, we might say its interest was common. One could think of
the Chancellor as hearing the plaintiffs' claim, which was identical to
the claims of others within a preexisting social group, and then rounding
up the scope of the decision (from most tenants to all tenants, for exam-
ple).35 The Chancellor would then control the defendant's conduct with
respect to this rounded-up group of plaintiffs and nonplaintiffs. The
Chancellor would not control the defendant's conduct against the world,
or against other potential plaintiffs who might bring other kinds of
claims.
35 HENRY L. McCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 480-82 (2d ed.
1948).
36 See I JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 245-246,
at 464-68 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 194).
37 Chancery suits involving these different uses of a bill of peace are cited in 2 JAMES BARR
AMES, A SELECTION OF CASES IN EQUITY JURISDICTION 55 (1929). For sketches of two of
the classic cases, How v. Tenants of Bromsgrove and Brown v. Vermuden, see Stephen C. Yeazell,
Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
866, 869-71 (1977). Many of these representative suits were "impersonal." See Robert G. Bone, Per-
sonal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative Representation,
7o B.U. L. REV. 213 (1990) (reviewing STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITI-
GATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987)).
38 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., John L. Gedid & Stephen Sowle, An Historical Analysis of the
Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1865 (1998) (describing early English bill of
peace cases as ones in which "the court could treat groups - fellow tenants, fellow miners, fellow
merchants - as some kind of set or entity for procedural purposes"); Yeazell, supra note 37, at 870-
71 (noting, for "the earliest group litigation for which we have published reports," id. at 870, that
all the cases "involve[d] disputes arising out of manor or parish communities," id. at 87 ).
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These principles were carried over into American equity.39 A suit
had to fall under one of the recognized heads of equity jurisprudence.40
Courts would "take care to make no decree [that would] affect" the
rights of nonparties.4 1 As for the bill of peace, one application and ex-
tension came in suits by taxpayers against tax collectors. Beginning in
the mid-nineteenth century, some state courts were willing to enjoin the
collection of an illegal tax, not only with respect to the plaintiffs but
with respect to any taxpayer; other state courts disagreed, and would
give relief only as to the plaintiffs.42 Yet when courts did give broader
relief it was in cases involving municipal or county taxes.43 The theory
was still that the bill of peace, or the injunction in the nature of a bill of
peace, was resolving the common claims of a cohesive group, what
might be called a micropolity.44
There is evidence that late in the nineteenth century courts extended
this reasoning from suits to enjoin tax collection to other challenges,
allowing a successful plaintiff to obtain an injunction protecting all sim-
ilarly situated persons. Again what was challenged were not federal or
state laws but municipal ordinances.4 5
39 See Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 302-03 (1854); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COM-
MENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 854-857, at 190-93 (Boston, Charles C. Little &
James Brown, 4 th ed. 1846). One treatise writer noted with disapproval that the American courts
were "reluctant to go much beyond" the English decisions in which the Chancellor granted a bill of
peace. GEORGE L. CLARK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 439, at 580 (0937).
40 E.g., Dows v. City of Chicago, 78 U.S. (ii Wall.) 1o8, og-io (1870).
41 Joy v. Wirtz, 13 F Cas. 1172, 1174 (C.C.D. Pa. 18o6) (No. 7554) (Washington, J.) (creditors'
bill); see also 3 THOMAS W. WATERMAN, THE AMERICAN CHANCERY DIGEST 157 (New York,
Banks, Gould & Co., 3d ed. 1851) ("Care will be taken not to make a decree which will affect the
person who is not a party to the suit." (citing Joy, 13 F Cas. 1172)).
42 See CLARK, supra note 39, § 443, at 589-91.
43 E.g., Carlton v. Newman, I A. 194 (Me. 1885) (municipal tax); McTwiggan v. Hunter, 30 A.
962, 963 (R.I. 1895) (municipal tax). See generally i POMEROY, supra note 36, § 260, at 526-37.
44 Cf Smith, 57 U.S. at 303 ("[A] court of equity permits a portion of the parties in interest to
represent the entire body . . . ." (emphasis added)); 1 POMEROY, supra note 36, § 26o, at 534
("[C]omplete and final relief may be given to an entire community by means of one judicial de-
cree . . . ." (emphasis added)). Note that a related question is the ability of a taxpayer to get an
injunction restraining not the illegal collection of money but its illegal expenditure. That kind of
suit, which is usually called a "taxpayer's suit," also seems to be traceable to the mid-nineteenth
century in municipal cases. See Crampton v. Zabriskie, i05 U.S. 6o, 609 (188o); JAFFE, supra
note 32, at 470-71. Courts were slower to allow suits enjoining the collection of a state tax with
respect to nonplaintiffs. That development was almost entirely confined to the twentieth century,
and as late as 1960 there were many states that either did not allow taxpayer suits (for example,
New York), or had not resolved the question (for example, California). See id.; Note, Taxpayers'
Suits. A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE L.J. 895, 901 & nn.31 & 33 (2960).
45 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Collins, 51 N.E. 907, 908, 911 (111. 1898). See generally I AMER-
ICAN AND ENGLISH DECISIONS IN EQUITY 75-77 (Henry Budd ed., Philadelphia, M. Murphy
1895); 1 POMEROY, supra note 36, § 261b, at 540-41; Note, Equity - Jurisdiction - Prevention
of Multiplicity of Suits, 16 MINN. L. REV. 679 (1932). Professor Bob Bone has said of the late
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century courts: "[T]he importance of conclusively establishing the
legality of official acts as well as the desirability of preventing burdensome repetitive litigation were
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B. The Changing Scope of Injunctions Against Federal Defendants
There were apparently no national injunctions against federal de-
fendants for the first century and a half of the United States. They seem
to have been rejected as unthinkable as late as Frothingham v. Mellon,46
and to have been conspicuously absent as late as Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer.47 They did not remain so. The 196os and 1970s
were a time of flux in regard to the scope of injunctions - national
injunctions seemed to be within the power of a federal district court, but
there was some uncertainty or discomfort about using them. By the
1980s and 199os, to some judges they were an ordinary part of the re-
medial arsenal of the federal courts. There was no major case. No
statute altered the federal courts' powers. Instead, the changes seem to
have been gradual and driven by shifts in thinking about preventive
suits and invalid laws.
i. No National Injunctions (to the ig60s). - In the nineteenth cen-
tury, federal courts would issue injunctions that protected the plaintiff
from the enforcement of a federal statute, regulation, or order - not
injunctions that protected all possible plaintiffs throughout the United
States.4 8 For example, in Georgia v. Atkins,49 the state of Georgia sued
in federal court for an injunction against James Atkins, a federal tax
collector. Georgia's claim was that it was illegal to impose a federal
corporate tax upon a state (in this case, a tax on the Western & Atlantic
Railroad that was owned and operated by the state of Georgia). The
court agreed and issued an injunction. But the injunction was not
against the enforcement of the tax upon states generally, nor even
against the enforcement of the tax upon Georgia generally, but rather to
strong affirmative reasons to bar subsequent suits by nonparty class members, whether the plaintiff
won or lost her first suit." Bone, supra note 37, at 275. Bone's conclusion does not appear to
contradict the point made here: the support he cites is a federal equity case from 1901 involving a
challenge to a municipal ordinance. Id. at 275 n.II (citing McIntosh v. City of Pittsburg, I12 F.
705, 709 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1901)).
46 Massachusetts v. Mellon (Frothingham), 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
47 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
48 Note that before 1875 the federal courts lacked statutory federal question jurisdiction, apart
from a brief period from 18oi to 1802. See Judiciary Act of 18o, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92 (repealed
1802) (establishing federal question jurisdiction); Judiciary Act of I875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470,
470 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012)) (reestablishing federal question jurisdiction).
Yet, even without federal question jurisdiction, the federal courts would still have had the oppor-
tunity - where sovereign immunity could be avoided - to restrain the enforcement of a federal
statute, regulation, or order in the following circumstances: (a) an injunction issued by the U.S.
Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction; (b) an injunction in a diversity suit, including one brought
by an alien, that somehow managed to include a federal officer or agency; (c) a suit by the United
States; (d) a suit in admiralty; (e) a suit by a federally chartered corporation, such as the Bank of
the United States; and (f) a suit by a state. I am grateful to Professors Will Baude and Stephen
Sachs for discussion of this list.
49 io F. Cas. 241 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1866) (No. 5350) (bill in equity). This is an example of category
(f) in the preceding footnote.
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restrain Mr. Atkins "from further proceeding in the collection of the sum
of six thousand and four dollars and fifty-six cents, claimed to be due to
the United States."so The scope of the injunction matched what the
court perceived as the scope of its authority. That is, the court recog-
nized its "jurisdiction or power . .. ,if the tax sought to be collected is
illegal, unwarranted by the act of congress, to interpose by writ of
injunction, and arrest the threatened invasion of the property of the
complainant."sI
In fact, in the nineteenth century, the idea of suing to restrain the
enforcement of a federal statute everywhere in the nation seems not to
have found any acceptance, and it may never even have been raised.
Consider, by comparison, a suit against a state. In 1895, James Donald
sued the state of South Carolina, arguing that the confiscation of alcohol
that he imported for his own private consumption was a violation of the
federal Constitution.5 2 The U.S. Supreme Court held the state statute
unconstitutional.5 3 Mr. Donald asked for damages,54 as well as an in-
junction restraining the enforcement of the statute by any state execu-
tive officer against Mr. Donald or anyone else.5 5 The Court objected to
the overbroad injunction,5 6 and its reasoning would apply a fortiori to
a national injunction:
But while we think that the complainant was entitled to an injunction
against those defendants who had despoiled him of his property, and who
were threatening to continue so to do, we are unable to wholly approve the
decree entered in this case.
The theory of the decree is that the plaintiff is one of a class of persons
whose rights are infringed and threatened, and that he so represents such
class that he may pray an injunction on behalf of all persons that constitute
it. It is, indeed, possible that there may be others in like case with the
plaintiff, and that such persons may be numerous, but such a state of facts
is too conjectural to furnish a safe basis upon which a court of equity ought
to grant an injunction.5 7
50 Id. at 241.
s1 Id. at 242 (emphasis added).
52 See Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 59, 78-86 (1897) (law side).
53 See id. at 99-101.
54 Id. at 59.
5s Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 07, no (1897) (equity side).
56 On this point the Court was seemingly unanimous. Justice Brown dissented without an opin-
ion. Id. at 117. But because he dissented with an opinion in the counterpart case on the Court's
law side, which resolved Mr. Donald's challenge to the constitutionality of the statute, it seems
almost certain that his dissent had more to do with the merits than with the remedy - he would
not have wanted an even broader injunction. See Scott, 165 U.S. at 102-07 (Brown, J., dissenting).
Justice Brewer did not participate in the resolution of the case.
57 Scott, 165 U.S. at 115.
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Beginning in 1906, Congress gave the federal courts power to review
the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).ss The grant
of jurisdiction was needed "because then, for the first time, the ratemak-
ing power was conferred upon the commission, and then disobedience
of its orders was first made punishable."9 When shippers challenged
these ratemaking orders from the ICC in federal court, and succeeded,
the injunction would be limited in scope to the parties. For example,
the ICC's order setting the shipping rate at x for this shipper was invalid
and its enforcement enjoined.60
Or consider another case, one in which a federal agency rule was
challenged on the grounds that it exceeded the agency's jurisdiction. In
Waite v. Macy,6 1 tea importers sought to enjoin the federal Tea Board
from applying to their teas a regulation blocking the import of any tea
containing artificial coloring.62 The Court held the regulation invalid,
because it exceeded the statute that gave the Tea Board its authority,
but the Court upheld an injunction that apparently protected only the
plaintiffs.6 3
A case worth considering in detail is Frothingham v. Mellon. It is
now generally considered to be a case about "taxpayer standing,"64 but
that is not how it was decided by the Supreme Court. The case looks
quite different when seen through the lens of equity. The individual
plaintiff, Harriet Frothingham, brought a suit to enjoin various federal
officers from spending money under the authority of the Maternity Act,
on the ground that the statute exceeded the power of the national gov-
ernment.65 The complaint demanded a national injunction.66 Indeed,
58 2 F TROWBRIDGE VOM BAUR, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 635, at 616 (1942) (re-
ferring to the Hepburn Act of 1906, ch. 3591, § 5, 34 Stat. 584, 590, 592 (Codified as amended in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.)).
59 Id.
60 "Even when a large shipper secured an injunction, the scope of its relief often protected only
that particular shipper, leaving his weaker competitors at the mercy of the new rate." Arrow T1ansp.
Co. v. S. Ry. Co., 372 U.S. 658, 663-64 (1963). The power to enjoin ICC ratemaking orders was
also constrained by the requirement of a three-judge court and a direct appeal as of right to the
Supreme Court. 2 VOM BAUR, supra note 58, § 634, at 615-16.
61 246 U.S. 6o6 (1918).
62 Id. at 607-09. A coincidence, it seems, but the coloring at issue in this 1918 case was "Prussian
Blue." Id. at 608.
63 See id. at 607 ("This is a bill brought by importers of tea to prevent the appellants, a board
of general appraisers known as the Tea Board,from applying to tea imported by the plaintiffs tests
which, it is alleged, are illegal and if applied will lead to the exclusion of the tea." (emphasis added));
id. at 6og-lo.
64 See, e.g., Elizabeth Magill, Standingfor the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131, 1169
(2oo9) (referring to "the prohibition on taxpayer standing established in 1923 in Frothingham v.
Mellon").
65 Frothingham, 262 U.S. 447, 448, 479 (1923).
66 Transcript of Record at 6-7, Frothingham, 262 U.S. 447 (No. 962) ("Wherefore the plaintiff
prays that said Sheppard-Towner Act be declared unconstitutional and void, and that the Defend-
ants their assistants, agents and servants be enjoined and restrained from acting or proceeding
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if Mrs. Frothingham were to have any remedy, it would have, to be a
national injunction: a prohibition on using her tax money for the Ma-
ternity Act would have been wholly ineffectual, because of the fungibil-
ity of money. The federal trial court, which was then called the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia, denied the injunction, and the court
of appeals affirmed pro forma.6 1 In an opinion for a unanimous
Supreme Court of the United States, Justice Sutherland made three ar-
guments for why Mrs. Frothingham could not receive an injunction.
First, the Court distinguished the cases allowing one person to sue
on behalf of others. The Court noted that individual taxpayers could
sue municipal corporations (such as a city), and that the relationship of
the individual to a municipal corporation resembled the relationship of
a stockholder to a private corporation.68 For a reader steeped in the
bill-of-peace precedents from English and American equity, Justice
Sutherland was making a point about equitable jurisdiction. Equity
allowed certain kinds of representative suits, and in nineteenth-century
American law the prototypical examples were suits against municipal
corporations and public corporations by one or more individual plain-
tiffs (taxpayers and stockholders, respectively).6 9 But the scale and re-
lationship of the individual to the national government were "very dif-
ferent." 0 In a case like this, Justice Sutherland wrote, "no basis is
afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of a court of equity.""
under the alleged authority of said Act to carry its provisions into effect, or to expend the public
monies for that purpose, and that the. Plaintiff may have such other and further relief as to this
Court may seem just and equitable.").
67 Id. at 11-12. This was done to speed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court, so it could be paired
with a case in the Court's original jurisdiction. Id.
68 Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486-87.
69 E.g., Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922) (allowing eight members of the Chicago Board
of Trade to sue the Secretary of Agriculture on behalf of all 16io members, seeking an injunction
that would restrain the enforcement against the Board of an allegedly unconstitutional statute); see
Hazard, Gedid & Sowle, supra note 38, at 1889-90 (noting analogy in nineteenth century between
taxpayer suits and stockholder suits); see also id. at 1852 (noting the strong legal emphasis on the
"unitary aspect" of corporations, "whether business, nonprofit, or municipal"). The conditions un-
der which equity would intervene were reminiscent of the business judgment rule:
No principle of equity jurisprudence is, perhaps, better established than that when the
officers of a municipal corporation are clothed with a discretionary power, and are acting
within the scope of such power, a court of equity will not sit in review of their proceedings,
or interfere by injunction, at the suit of a private citizen, unless fraud is shown, or the
power of discretion is being manifestly abused, to the oppression of the citizen.
i AMERICAN AND ENGLISH DECISIONS IN EQUITY, supra note 45, at 73-74. The resemblance
is especially striking if the business judgment rule is seen as an abstention doctrine. See Stephen
M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004).
70 Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487.
71 Id. The Court also described the relationship of the municipal taxpayer to the corporation in
terms of "reasons which support the extension of the equitable remedy." Id. For a more critical
view of the Court's unwillingness to extend the municipal cases to the national government, see
Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending - The Role of Legal and Equitable Principles, 4 CHAP.
L. REV. I, 34-35 (2001).
2017]1 431
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
Second, the Court invoked logistical problems - "inconve-
niences"7 2 - that would be caused by letting individual taxpayers bring
suits like Mrs. Frothingham's:
If one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then every other
taxpayer may do the same, not only in respect of the statute here under
review but also in respect of every other appropriation act and statute whose
administration requires the outlay of public money, and whose validity may
be questioned.7 3
Here the Court emphasized that "no precedent sustaining the right to
maintain suits like this has been called to our attention."7 4
Finally, the Frothingham Court suggested that the plaintiffs had fun-
damentally misunderstood our constitutional system and the role of the
federal courts. The Court carefully distinguished suits to require exec-
utive officers to perform ministerial duties.7 5 Then the Court rebuked
the very notion that it could give relief, in words that had nothing to do
with the fact that Mrs. Frothingham was a taxpayer and everything to
do with the fact that she sought a national injunction. The federal
courts could hear a suit to prevent an enforcement action, but they could
not decide a: freestanding challenge to a statute.7 6 What they can do
with respect to an invalid statute "amounts to little more than the neg-
ative power to disregard an unconstitutional enactment."" The Court
then proceeded to what it saw as the fundamental problem with the suit,
a question now considered in terms of "standing" but one that for the
Court involved not only standing but also the kind of remedy equity
could afford:
The party who invokes the power must be able to show not only that the
statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely
that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally. If
a case for preventive relief be presented the court enjoins, in effect, not the
execution of the statute, but the acts of the official, the statute notwithstand-
ing. Here the parties plaintiff have no such case. Looking through forms
of words to the substance of their complaint, it is merely that officials of the
executive department of the government are executing and will execute an
72 Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 488.
76 In the Court's words:
We have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground that they
are unconstitutional. That question may be considered only when the justification for
some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest
upon such an act. Then the power exercised is that of ascertaining and declaring the law





act of Congress asserted to be unconstitutional; and this we are asked to
prevent. To do so would be not to decide a judicial controversy, but to
assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and
co-equal department, an authority which plainly we do not possess.7 8
In short, to call Frothingham a case about "standing" misunderstands
the way its analysis intertwines concepts of equity, remedies, and the
judicial power. The Court was being asked to "prevent" (that is, enjoin)
the enforcement of the statute, not just against a plaintiff who was
threatened with direct injury, but against "people generally." And that,
the Court concluded, was beyond the powers conferred by Article III.
More examples of the traditional pattern can be given. In Adkins v.
Children's Hospital of the District of Columbia,9 a challenge was
brought to a federal statute establishing a minimum wage for women in
the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs, including a hospital, received
an injunction that prohibited the enforcement of the law only against
themselves.80
In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,"' the plaintiffs challenged a statu-
tory provision allowing the President to restrict interstate shipment of
oil, as well as regulations promulgated by the Department of the Interior
under the statutory provision.8 2 The provision was part of the National
Industrial Recovery Act, a central piece of New Deal legislation. It was
exactly the kind of case that today would feature a request for a national
injunction. But the plaintiffs did not seek one. Instead they sought an
injunction against three federal officers - all then residing in Texas -
to keep them from enforcing the law against the plaintiffs. 3 In partic-
ular, they sought an injunction that would keep "the defendants from
further coming upon the refining plant of the plaintiff, Panama Refining
Company, or interfering with it in any manner" in its refining, purchas-
ing, and disposing of oil; restrain the defendants "from coming upon the
property of the plaintiff, A. F. Anding"; prohibit them "from further de-
manding of either of the plaintiffs reports called for" in regulations
promulgated under the Act; and restrain them "from instituting any
criminal proceedings against these plaintiffs because of the violation" of
the regulations.84 The district court proceeded to enjoin the defendants
"from enforcing any rule or regulation . . . under the National Industrial
78 Id. at 488-89.
79 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
80 Transcript of Record at 15, Adkins (No. 795).
81 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
82 Id. at 405-II.
83 Transcript of Record at I-2, Panama Refining Co. (No. 135). One of these officers, J. Howard
Marshall, was an assistant to the Attorney General of the United States "temporarily residing in
Smith County, Texas" in 1933. Id. at i. Sixty-one years later he gained a measure of notoriety from
marrying Anna Nicole Smith.
84 Id. at 8-9.
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Recovery Act insofar as the same applies to ... petroleum,"85 and from
"going upon or about the premises of complainants or in any wise inter-
fering with them."86 To a reader today, the first part of the injunction
quoted might seem to reach beyond the parties. But there is no evidence
it was understood that way at the time, and there is considerable evi-
dence that everyone recognized that the district court gave the plaintiffs
what they sought: a plaintiff-protective injunction."'
Indeed, the litigation resulting in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan was
only part of a larger wave of challenges to New Deal legislation. As
then-Attorney General Robert Jackson described it, after the Supreme
Court held various New Deal acts unconstitutional, "'hell broke loose'
in the lower courts.""8 The precise form that hell took was the grant of
"injunctions restraining officers of the Federal Government from carry-
ing out acts of Congress."8 9 How many injunctions were there? Against
the enforcement of just one statutory provision, the processing tax in the
Agricultural Adjustment Act, there were 16oo injunctions.90  The
Department of Justice released a report in 1937 called Injunctions in
Cases Involving Acts of Congress, which reviewed and tabulated all of
these injunctions with an eye toward their effect on the national gov-
ernment.91 I have not reviewed these thousands of decrees, but the re-
port itself makes no mention of any of one of them having national
85 Id. at 133.
86 Id. at 134.
87 The reasons are: (a) the district court's injunction ran only against these three federal defen-
dants, and the district court specifically held that the Secretary of the Interior was not an indispens-
able party, id. at 137; (b) the district court's legal conclusions focused on the defendants' authority
vis-2-vis the plaintiffs, not others, id. at 137-38; (c) the defendants found many faults in the injunc-
tion, see id. at 142-44, including the first part of the injunction, but without any suggestion it
erroneously protected nonparties; and (d) the Panama Refining Company's brief in the Supreme
Court described the injunction it won in plaintiff-protective terms:
[A]ppellants were entitled to an injunction against the further enforcement of said regula-
tions against them, and the further interference by the agents of the Department of the
Interior, acting under the purported authority of said regulations, with the appellants in
carrying on their business of producing, storing, and refining oil, and the transportation
thereof in intrastate commerce.
Brief for Appellants at 8, Panama Refining Co. (No. 135). Moreover, other district courts appear
not to have understood it as having broader effect. See, e.g., United States v. Mills, 7 F. Supp. 547,
553 n.2 (D. Md. 1934).
88 ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A CRI-
SIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS I15 (1941). The book was published in 1941, the year Justice
Jackson was confirmed to the Supreme Court.
89 Id. Seeing the government burdened by injunctions "too readily granted," Professor Sidney
Post Simpson made the adventuresome suggestion of a bill of peace - for a federal agency, against
all its challengers. See Sidney Post Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, 5o HARV. L. REV.
171, 246-47 (1936); see also id. at 246 n-44o (recognizing that federal legislation might be needed).
90 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INJUNCTIONS IN CASES INVOLVING ACTS OF CONGRESS, S. Doc.
NO. 75-42, at I (Ist Sess. 1937).
91 Letter from Homer Cummings, U.S. Att'y Gen., to President of the Senate of the United
States (Feb. 17, 1937), reprinted in DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note go, at III (enclosing the report).
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scope. This is a dog that didn't bark: if the district courts had been
issuing national injunctions, the silence of the report would be inexpli-
cable.9 2 To the contrary, the report repeatedly describes injunctions as
restricting the application of a statute to a particular party.9 3  The in-
junctions did severely impede the national government's efforts to en-
force New Deal legislation. But that impediment came from the quan-
tity of injunctions, the quantity of the plaintiffs in some individual cases,
and the force of precedent dissuading federal officers from enforcing a
statute.9 4  Even at this point in American constitutional history - a
point at which lower courts were famously "reckless, partisan, and irre-
sponsible" in their award of injunctions against the national govern-
ment9 5 - the pattern remained one of plaintiff-protective injunctions.
Almost two decades later, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, the district court issued a preliminary injunction that did not
restrain the seizure of all steel mills. In its initial form, the preliminary
injunction protected all the plaintiffs save one.
9 6
92 The same potent argument from silence holds for then-Attorney General Jackson. He se-
verely criticized the lower federal courts for their overreaching, see JACKSON, supra note 88, at
115-23, but he never raised an objection to the scope of the injunctions.
93 See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note go, at 3 (describing injunctions against the processing tax
under the Agricultural Adjustment Act); id. at 40 ("The effect of the injunctions or restraining
orders granted by the district courts of California and in the District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio is to relieve those particular taxpayers from paying taxes presumably due on their pro-
cessing of coconut oil."); id. at 45 ("The effect of such injunctive relief as has been granted on the
operation and enforcement of the internal-revenue law has been confined to restraining that en-
forcement only as to the particular complainant bringing the suit."); id. at 52 ("The effect of the
injunctions [against enforcement of the Kerr-Smith Tobacco Act] was to relieve those particular
taxpayers from paying the taxes imposed."); id. at 63 (noting in suits challenging loans for municipal
power plants made pursuant to the National Industrial Recovery Act that "[t]he effect of the re-
straining orders and injunctions issued in these cases has been to delay or impede the construction
of the particular projects concerned"); id. at 88-89 (noting that three federal district courts issued
fifty-nine injunctions restraining the collection of the windfall taxes, which "relieved these plaintiffs
from filing their returns," id. at 89).
94 See, e.g., id. at 37 (noting, with respect to suit by approximately 2200 cotton producers to
enjoin collection of tax under the Bankhead Cotton Control Act, that "[t]he granting of the injunc-
tions paralyzed the Government's efforts to enforce the Bankhead Act in Georgia"); id. at 38 (ob-
serving that the grant of injunctions in more than a hundred cases challenging the tax under the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act "made it impossible to enforce the act, and no effort was made
to enforce it even against companies which had not brought suit"); id. at 59 (attributing the lack of
enforcement of the National Industrial Recovery Act in the months preceding Schechter Poultry to
the fact that "a number of lower courts had held the act unconstitutional," and noting that cause
may be attributable "as much to the decisions denying the constitutionality of the act as to the fact
that injunctions were granted restraining its enforcement"); see also id. (noting that when a district
court enjoined a prosecution under the National Industrial Recovery Act, federal prosecutors would
not engage in "further prosecution in that district").
95 JACKSON, supra note 88, at 123 (denouncing this "picture of judicial supremacy at work in
the district courts of the United States").
96 Youngstown Sheet & Tbe Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569, 577 (D.D.C. 1952); HENRY M.
HART JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
1204-05 (1953). That one plaintiff was the United States Steel Company; it had sought a narrower
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A single case from the federal courts' first century and a half does
not fit this pattern. In Hammer v. Dagenhart9 7 corporations opposed
to the federal child labor statute organized a challenge in the Western
District of North Carolina.98 The plaintiffs they selected were two
brothers, one fifteen and one thirteen, and the boys' father. The federal
district judge held the law unconstitutional and granted the injunction
the plaintiffs requested - an injunction restraining the enforcement of
the statute within the Western District of North Carolina.99 The injunc-
tion thus went further than merely prohibiting enforcement against the
plaintiffs.100 The Attorney General directed federal district attorneys to
continue to bring prosecutions under the statute outside the Western
District of North Carolina.0 1 The case was appealed directly to
the U.S. Supreme Court, which affirmed,10 2 but without discussing the
remedy.
At least in theory, the injunction in Hammer v. Dagenhart was a
substantial deviation from equity practice. Once an injunction can
protect nonparties (as opposed to protecting only the plaintiffs), it is a
matter of judicial grace how far it extends. The territorial boundaries
of the court are not a sound limit, for it has long been established that
equity can enjoin extraterritorial acts.0 3 Nevertheless, the injunction
in Hammer v. Dagenhart seems to have been an aberration more than
the start of a new practice. The district court proceedings were sloppy;
despite the importance of the case, the judge did not even issue a written
opinion.04 Subsequently, when Congress passed a tax on child labor
and it was challenged - not coincidentally - before the same district
judge, he issued an injunction restraining the collection of the tax only
as to the plaintiffs. 0 5 Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that the plain-
tiffs in Hammer v. Dagenhart did not seek, and the court did not award,
a national injunction. This seems clearly to be because the corporate
funders of the litigation did not think a national injunction was possible:
mill owners from out of state, including those of South Carolina, would
have wanted a national injunction.106
injunction that would, the court thought, in effect authorize the federal action. Youngstown, 103 F.
Supp. at 577.
97 247 U.S. 251 (igi8).
98 See STEPHEN B. WOOD, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA:
CHILD LABOR AND THE LAW I-gg (1968).
99 Id. at 107-08.
100 On the idea of a geographic solution to the national injunction problem, see supra note 19.
101 See WOOD, supra note 98, at iog.
102 Hammer, 247 U.S. at 277.
103 See sources cited infra note 320.
104 See WOOD, supra note 98, at los.
105 Id. at 230.
106 Id. at 83 (noting concentration in North and South Carolina of "aggressively active opposi-
tion" to the child labor statute).
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There is a coda to the story of Hammer v. Dagenhart. Counsel for
Mrs. Frothingham argued that in previous cases the Court had "permit-
ted a proceeding to be maintained by one of a large class affected by
a law alleged to be invalid, for the purpose of enjoining a public of-
ficer."' 0 7 Of the authorities cited by her counsel, only one case involved
a federal statute operative outside the District of Columbia: Hammer v.
Dagenhart.08 If there was any chance that it should be taken to support
a national injunction, the idea was decisively rejected in Frothingham
v. Mellon.
2. The Emergence of National Injunctions (from the ig60s). -
Through the middle of the twentieth century, there do not appear to
have been any national injunctions. Soon the national injunction would
seem possible, but still not widely accepted. Consider three cases in this
in-between time: Wirtz v. Baldor Electric Co.109 (1963), Flast v. Cohen"o
(1968), and Harlem Valley Transportation Association v. Stafford"'
(,973).
In Wirtz, a panel of the D.C. Circuit conditionally enjoined the use
of a determination by the Secretary of Labor about the prevailing wage
in the electrical promoters and generators industry.112 The court, con-
sisting of Chief Judge Bazelon and Judges Washington and Wright, had
found the Secretary's determination invalid. 13 It was less clear that
any of the plaintiffs had standing, so the court remanded for further
proceedings on that point in the district court.114 But the D.C. Circuit
panel nevertheless went ahead and resolved the scope of the injunction,
conditional on the district court finding standing."15 The panel's con-
clusion was clear: even though the suit was not certified as a class ac-
tion," 6 the Secretary should be enjoined from relying on his determina-
tion of the industry wage as to any business in the industry, not merely
as to the three plaintiffs."' Strikingly, the court cited no previous ex-
ample of such an injunction. Instead, it offered four arguments:
107 Frothingham, 262 U.S. 447, 475 (1923) (argument of William L. Rawls).
108 Id. Two other cases were cited by counsel. 7huax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), was a consti-
tutional challenge to a state statute with a prayer for injunctive relief that would protect only the
plaintiff. See 'lanscript of Record at i8-ig, Truax, 239 U.S. 33 (No. 361). Millard v. Roberts, 202
U.S. 429 (1906), was a constitutional challenge to the expenditure of federal taxpayer money in the
District of Columbia, id. at 436, which the Court resolved even while expressly reserving whether
"a taxpayer of the District of Columbia[] can raise the questions we have considered," id. at 438.
109 337 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
110 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
111 360 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
112 Wirtz, 337 F.2d at 520, 533-35.
113 Id. at 531.
114 Id. at 533.
115 Id. at 535.
116 Id. at 533 & n.34.
117 Id. at 534-35.
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First, the rule of law required intercase consistency: a "court would
ordinarily give the same relief to any individual who comes to it with
an essentially similar cause of action against the administrator."'a18 Tlue,
but beside the point. That the court would give an injunction to protect
someone else, if that person sued and won, does not establish the cor-
rectness of giving that person a remedy in the absence of suit.
Second, the court noted the potential for the Secretary to apply in-
consistent standards, giving some firms a competitive advantage.119
The risk was real, but the court assumed an inert and unresponsive
agency.
Third, the court pointed to the language in the Administrative
Procedure Act 20 (APA) instructing a court to "hold unlawful and set
aside" agency actions it finds to be invalid.121 Yet the court seemed to
recognize that the argument proved too much; it quickly retreated to
emphasizing its discretion about the scope of relief, which was to be
determined by various "legal and equitable considerations."12 2
Fourth, the court analogized the Secretary's determination to a stat-
ute held unconstitutional, which it noted would "be regarded as uncon-
stitutional as to all persons similarly situated."123 This argument side-
stepped a key point: "regard[ing a statute] as unconstitutional" is not the
same thing as enjoining its enforcement against anyone.124
Wirtz appears to have been the first national injunction in the United
States.12 5 Several points about it are especially remarkable. One is that
the court cited no prior cases that offered support for the scope of the
remedy. Another is that it anticipated the arguments that continue to
118 Id. at 534.
119 Id. For earlier recognition of this possibility, see supra note 60.
120 Ch. 324, 6o Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. H§ 551, 553-559, 701-706).
121 Wirtz, 337 F.2d at 534 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § ioog(e)(B) (1958)). National
injunctions were not contemplated when the APA was enacted. No court had previously given a
national injunction. Indeed, it was not even contemplated that there would be widespread use of
agency rulemaking: "Before the g6os agencies acted mainly through case-by-case adjudications."
Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking's Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 1960s and
1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139, 1145 (2oo). This expectation - that agencies would generally
make policy through adjudication - is consistent with the choice of "set aside" in the text of the
APA, for in prior judicial usage the phrase was used for reversing judgments. See, e.g., Morgan v.
Daniels, 153 U.S. I20, 124-25 (1894). (On the likely anachronism of reading "set aside" as synony-
mous with "strike down," see infra section II.B, pp. 449-52.) In short, whatever one's view of how
much the APA codified or changed existing practice, it never speaks with the clarity required to
displace the longstanding practice of plaintiff-protective injunctions. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S.
418, 433 (2009) (presuming that statutes conform to longstanding remedial principles).
122 Wirtz, 337 F.2d at 534.
123 Id. (emphasis added).
124 In support of this strained argument, the best the court could do was to cite two cases that
allowed third-party standing, Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 38-39 (1915), and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 51o (1925). Wirtz, 337 F.2d at 534.
125 I am grateful to Professor Michael Morley for bringing the case to my attention.
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be invoked in favor of the national injunction - arguments about con-
sistency between cases, about fragmentation in the law, and about the
APA. Finally, Wirtz seems to have been a pebble that sunk without
causing any ripples: no subsequent cases noted the scope of the remedy
in Wirtz.
Later in the 196os came Flast v. Cohen, a suit challenging the federal
government's expenditure of tax money. As in Frothingham, the com-
plaint requested a national injunction.2 6 Also as in Frothingham, be-
cause the suit was about federal expenditure of tax money, it would not
be possible to give the plaintiffs relief that involved only the taxes they
paid. By the time the case arrived at the Supreme Court, however, the
plaintiffs seem to have conceded that a national injunction would not
be appropriate and were suggesting that they wanted an injunction only
for New York City.127 But the Supreme Court did not hold them to that
concession, and expressly contemplated that the injunction might apply
beyond New York City programs.128
In Flast, the Court never endorsed a national injunction, but it cer-
tainly did not reject the possibility out of hand, as Frothingham had
done. The mention of the scope of the injunction came in the Court's
discussion of the procedural posture of the case (and its analysis of
whether a three-judge district court was properly convened).129 In de-
ciding the substantive issue in the case - whether plaintiffs could sue
in federal court - the Justices treated the question as one entirely about
"standing." In fact, how the Court read Frothingham was telling. The
Court divvied up different parts of Frothingham, allocating them to
buckets of "constitutional rule" 30 and "pure policy"' 3 ' but ignoring all
questions of federal power to grant equitable remedies. Indeed, Flast
126 Appendix at 5a, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (s968) (No. 416) ("This is a civil action brought
by the plaintiffs, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, for a temporary
and permanent injunction against he allocation and use of the funds of the United States to finance,
in whole or in part, instruction in sectarian schools, and to declare such use violative of the First
and Fifth Amendments to the Federal Constitution.").
127 See Flast, 392 U.S. at 89 ("[N]oting that appellants have conceded that the case should be
deemed one limited to the practices of the New York City Board of Education, the Government
contends that appellants wish only to forbid specific local programs which they find objectionable
and not to enjoin the operation of the broad range of programs under the statutory scheme.").
128 See id. ("It is true that the appellants' complaint makes specific reference to the New York
City Board of Education's programs which are funded under the challenged statute, and we can
assume that appellants' proof at trial would focus on those New York City programs. However,
we view these allegations of the complaint as imparting specificity and focus to the issues in the
lawsuit and not as limiting the impact of the constitutional challenge made in this case. The in-
junctive relief sought by appellants is not limited to programs in operation in New York City but
extends to any program that would have the unconstitutional features alleged in the complaint."
(emphasis omitted)).
129 See id. at 88-91.
130 Id. at 92.
131 Id. at 93.
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almost entirely ignored questions of remedy. It no longer seemed un-
thinkable that there would be a national injunction.
The next step was taken in Harlem Valley Transportation Association
v. Stafford. The Natural Resources Defense Council and other plaintiffs
sued several government defendants, including the Interstate Commerce
Commission, about precisely when the ICC needed to produce environ-
mental impact statements in railroad-abandonment proceedings.13 2 The
plaintiffs argued that the ICC was failing to comply with its legal duties
by waiting to produce the statement until the hearing itself, at which
point environmentalist intervenors were not in a position to effectively
challenge the conclusions in the statement.3 3
As the case unfolded, there was some confusion about what the scope
of the relief would be. The plaintiffs emphasized environmental harms
in the Northeast, and in particular the Harlem Valley.134 The plaintiffs
also asked for class certification on behalf of all who would be harmed
by the ICC's failure to timely produce the required statements.13 5 Judge
Frankel was obviously concerned about whether he had power to issue
a broad injunction if a class was not certified, yet the government de-
fendants conceded the point. As Judge Frankel said in his opinion ac-
companying the preliminary injunction:
One of the court's main concerns during the hearing of the motion for a
preliminary injunction was the question whether the plaintiffs, if they could
prove entitlement to any relief, could legitimately seek a restraint of nation-
wide effect when their alleged interests might be of narrower geographic
scope. Both the United States and the ICC have now not only conceded,
but insisted, that a preliminary injunction in this case would "affect the
agency in the entire scope of its authority and jurisdiction."'3 6
Given this concession, Judge Frankel decided that "[i]n these circum-
stances, it becomes unimportant to decide at this early stage whether
the action may proceed as a class suit."'3  He granted a preliminary
injunction,3 8 and the Second Circuit affirmed with no further discus-
sion of the scope of injunctive relief. 39 That was that.
132 See Harlem Valley 'Tansp. Ass'n v. Stafford, 360 F. Supp. 1057, 059 (S.D.N.Y. r973).
133 See id. at io6i.
134 Id. at IO60, lo64.
135 See id. at io6o.
136 Id. at io6o n.2 (quoting Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum at 4, Stafford, 360 F. Supp.
,057 (No. 73 Civ. 1330)). Judge Frankel added the following quotation from the brief of the
government defendants: "Any action by this Court based on plaintiffs' individual interests and
the public interest will affect the agency's procedures and the application of said procedures
anywhere within the scope of the agency's jurisdiction." Id. (quoting Defendants' Supplemental
Memorandum, supra, at 4-5).
137 Id.
138 Id. at lo65-66.
139 See Harlem Valley 'lYansp. Ass'n v. Stafford, 500 F2d 328, 332-37 (2d Cir. 1974).
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The district court had backed into a national injunction without any
real consideration. Multiple points made the decision an odd formative
moment. One is the government's concession, which should not have
been decisive. A court's equity powers are not determined by the con-
cessions of the parties; many equitable doctrines protect the public and
the court itself.14 0  One of the defendants (the Department of Justice)
actually agreed with the plaintiffs on the merits.14' The merits had al-
ready been decided in an earlier Second Circuit case, as the ICC had
previously admitted42 - an admission it was now trying to escape with
implausible distinctions. And as for the remedy, the case was not even
an appropriate one for an injunction. Because the government defend-
ants had indicated that they would comply and there was no need to
manage that compliance, the court should instead have granted a de-
claratory judgment.14 3
The decision by the district court in Stafford was affirmed the next
year by the Second Circuit. Intervening developments explain the
court's willingness to affirm a national injunction, and especially im-
portant were two opinions by Judge Friendly. First, there was a
case that had been brought by five plaintiffs against the Civil Service
Commission of the City of New York, alleging that its requirements for
new firefighters were racially discriminatory.144 Second, a case had been
brought by two applicants for unemployment benefits challenging a
New York state agency's rule that no benefits could be paid to those
who moved to a place with "high persistent unemployment" (in this case,
Puerto Rico).145  In neither case was class certification appropriate: in
the former because of the inadequacy of the representatives4 6 and in
140 See Samuel L. Bray, The System ofEquitable Remedies, 63 UCLAL. REV. 530, 572-86 (2ol6);
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Remedial Clauses: The Overprivatization of Private Law, 67 HASTINGS
L.J. 407, 411 (20I6) (referring to "the public's interest in reserving remedial decisionmaking to im-
partial adjudicators who are positioned to tailor remedies with sensitivity to the details of the cir-
cumstances and significance of a breach").
141 See Stafford, 360 F Supp. at 1o65.
142 See id. at ro62-64.
143 See Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1091, 1144-
45 (2014).
144 Vulcan Soc'y of the N.Y.C. Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir.
1973). The requirements challenged by the plaintiffs included some that affected them, such as a
written examination, and some that did not affect them, such as a diploma requirement and a
conviction bar. Id. at 399. The district judge himself said there was "serious question as to whether
any of the plaintiffs have standing to challenge" the latter requirements. Vulcan Soc'y of the N.Y.C.
Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 360 F. Supp. 1265, 1277 n.35 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The district
judge decided the written examination was unconstitutional and enjoined its use by the city. Id. at
1277-78. The district judge reached the merits without deciding the motion for class certification.
Id. at 1266 n.i.
145 Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1257 (2d Cir. 1973).
146 See Vulcan Soc'y, 490 F.2d at 399-400.
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the latter because of the difficulty of administering relief on a class
basis. 14
Aware that these suits were imperfect vehicles, Judge Friendly nev-
ertheless strongly encouraged the municipal and state defendants to give
up the discriminatory rules. In doing so, he blurred the distinction be-
tween what the court's decree required the defendant to do and what
the defendant chose to do. In the firefighter case, Judge Friendly said
it would be "unthinkable" for a losing municipality to "insist on other
actions being brought."148 Judge Friendly also advised the plaintiffs
about how to perfect their case, suggesting that if class certification were
denied on remand, the complaint could be amended to include other
plaintiffs, in order to ensure that there were some plaintiffs affected by
each of the challenged requirements.'4 9  He added, now advising the
city of New York: "If we may be pardoned for speaking practically, we
cannot understand why the municipal defendants should resist such an
amendment."o5 0 "It is evident," he said, that these points "will be raised
sooner or later, and . . . it is in everyone's interest that questions about
them should be promptly resolved."5 , In the unemployment benefits
case, Judge Friendly treated the judgment as running to the benefit of
similarly situated parties merely because the state defendants chose to
comply.15 2
Once the distinction between legal and practical effect was collapsed,
and once the state defendants had signaled they would acquiesce, it no
longer seemed to matter who the plaintiffs were, and one plaintiff could
get a universal injunction. As Judge Friendly said, "insofar as the relief
sought is prohibitory, an action seeking declaratory or injunctive relief
against state officials on the ground of unconstitutionality of a statute
or administrative practice is the archetype of one where class action
designation is largely a formality, at least for the plaintiffs." 5 3 All of
these assertions from Judge Friendly were dicta, and if read carefully
they did not sharply contradict he traditional equitable practice. "Prac-
tical" advice about what a government defendant should do is one thing,
and the "legal" effect of a remedy or judgment is another. Even Judge
Friendly's reference to the class action designation being a "formality"
was given two careful qualifications: "largely a formality, at least for the
147 Galvan, 490 F.2d at 1262.
148 Vulcan Soc'y, 490 E2d at 399.
149 See id. at 400.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Galvan, 490 F.2d at 1261 ("The State has made clear that it understands the judgment to bind
it with respect to all claimants; indeed even before entry of the judgment, it withdrew the challenged





plaintiffs."'15 4 That is denotatively true, because named plaintiffs do
typically receive the same injunctive relief regardless of whether a class
is certified. But for defendants and nonparties, it matters what the scope
of the injunction is. The hedges and qualifications were oversubtle.
Unsurprisingly, these opinions by Judge Friendly were taken to stand
for the proposition that class certification does not matter for injunctive
relief.' One plaintiff gets the same injunction that a class of plaintiffs
would. Once that proposition was accepted, it was an easy matter to
apply it in a suit against the national government. That is what the
Second Circuit did the next year - implicitly and without any express
discussion - when it affirmed the national injunction in Harlem Valley
Transportation Association v. Stafford.15 6
Hard procedural cases make bad law. Judge Friendly recognized
this in the firefighters case, when he noted that the district court judge
had decided the case without even ruling on the motion for class certi-
fication, adding that "the judge's commendable desire to get at the heart
of the complaint seems to have created a bit of a procedural impasse."5
Yet Judge Friendly's opinions also created an impasse. Stripped of the
hedges and qualifications, the principle is that an injunction can protect
nonparties. It is true that one could draw a line after municipal defen-
dants, given the history of broad equitable relief against them;58 or one
could draw a line after state defendants, for pragmatic reasons.5 9 But
if those lines are not drawn, a national injunction is simply a matter
of carrying the principle to its logical conclusion. That is what courts
have done over the subsequent decades as they have issued national
injunctions.
154 Id. (emphases added). Note that Judge Friendly similarly hedged a conclusion in the fire-
fighter case: "[The district judge] was entirely right in thinking it unnecessary, from the plaintiffs'
standpoint, for him to decide on class action designation in order to pass upon the issues raised in
regard to Exam 0159." Vulcan Soc'y, 490 F.2d at 399 (emphasis added). For that proposition, Judge
Friendly cited two Fifth Circuit cases, one of which, Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.
1963), is discussed below at note 225.
1ss Five relatives of servicemen missing in action in Vietnam sued the Secretaries of the Air Force,
Army, and Navy, challenging the statutes that determined when missing servicemen were declared
dead. McDonald v. McLucas, 371 F. Supp. 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The district court denied class
certification on the ground that it would be "largely a formality," id. at 833, because "[t]he court can
properly assume that an agency of the government would not persist in taking actions which violate
the rights of a service member's next of kin, if the statutes are declared unconstitutional," id. at 834.
The authority cited? The two Friendly opinions and a district court opinion relying on one of the
Friendly opinions. See id. at 833-34. The result? The district court held two provisions of the
U.S. Code unconstitutional and issued a national injunction against their enforcement. Id. at 837.
156 500 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974).
157 Vulcan Soc'y, 490 F.2d at 399.
158 See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
159 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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National injunctions were not immediately widespread.160 But in
time there were a number of cases in which federal courts issued
them.'6 ' In other cases, federal courts have declined to give national
injunctions.162 There is no rule against national injunctions; nor is there
a rule requiring them. In fact, a district judge can find authority sup-
porting any possible decision about the scope of the injunction. When
courts want to grant injunctions that go beyond protecting the plaintiffs,
they point to the extent of the violation, 163 the permissibility of injunc-
tions benefitting nonparties,164 the impracticality of giving an injunction
benefitting only the plaintiffs,165 and the need for complete relief.166
When courts want to grant injunctions that protect only the plaintiffs,
they point to the importance of allowing other federal courts to reach
their own decisions167 and the principle that equitable remedies should
be no more burdensome than necessary.68 As with Professor Karl
160 In 1977, a commentator could treat federal agencies' practice of nonacquiescence - accepting
defeat one circuit at a time, while continuing to apply and defend a challenged regulation in other
circuits - without ever discussing the possibility that an injunction might bind the agency through-
out the United States. Allan D. Vestal, Relitigation by Federal Agencies: Conflict, Concurrence and
Synthesis of Judicial Policies, 55 N.C. L. REV. 123 (1977).
161 E.g., Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F 3d 1399, 1409-o (D.C. Cir.
1998) (affirming national injunction against agency rule under Clean Water Act); Bresgal v. Brock,
843 F.2d 1163, 1168-72 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming with revision a national injunction requiring the
Secretary of Labor "to cease refusing to enforce the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers
Protection Act," id. at 1171, with respect to forestry workers); see also Davis v. Astrue, 874 F. Supp.
2d 856, 868-69 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (deferring ruling about whether individual plaintiffs could obtain
"systemwide" relief in suit against the Social Security Administration, id. at 868, but noting its
availability). More recent examples are cited infra section EI.A, pp. 457-6 1. Courts routinely reach
similar decisions in suits against state and municipal government officers. See, e.g., Clement v. Cal.
Dep't of Corr., 364 F.3d 1148, 1152-54 (9th Cir. 2004) (state); Soto-Lopez v. N.Y.C. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 840 F.2d r62, 168-69 (2d Cir. 1988) (municipality). Other cases are listed in
Siddique, supra note 6; and Berger, supra note 6.
162 E.g., Va. Soc'y for Human Life, Inc. v. FEC, 263 F.3d 379, 392-94 (4th Cir. 2001); Meinhold
v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 34 F 3d 1469, 1480 (9 th Cir. 1994); Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 728 n.I (9th
Cir. 1983).
163 E.g., Texas v. United States, 20I F. Supp. 3d 810, 836 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
164 E.g., Bresgal, 843 E2d at 1169.
165 E.g., id. at 1169-72.
166 E.g., Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1103-04 (6th Cir. 1994) (upholding national prelimi-
nary injunction against the Bureau of Prisons, which had been issued before class certification, on
the grounds that "[tihe named plaintiffs' gains in obtaining an injunction ... would be illusory," id.
at I104, if it were limited to controlling the actions of the Bureau of Prisons only at their own
prison); Davis, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 867-69 (denying motion to dismiss non-class action against the
Social Security Administration and noting the possibility of a national injunction where necessary
"for the plaintiffs to get effective relief," id. at 868).
167 E.g., Va. Soc'y for Human Life, 263 F.3d at 393-94.
168 E.g., id. at 393; see also Ryan C. Williams, Due Process, Class Action Opt Outs, and the Right
Not to Sue, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 59g, 650-51 (2015).
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Llewellyn's famous dueling canons,16 9 there is always a principle on
each side.'7 0
II. WHY DID THE NATIONAL INJUNCTION EMERGE?
This Part offers an explanation for the national injunction. The ex-
planation is historical, and it blends doctrine, the institutional structure
of courts, and ideology (in the sense of changes in intellectual fashion
regarding law and the judicial role). The necessary condition for the
problems associated with the national injunction was a structural
change: the shift from a one-chancellor system to a multiple-chancellor
system. For the federal courts, that shift occurred in 1789. The shift to
multiple Chancellors was necessary but not sufficient to create the
forum-shopping and conflicting-injunction problems.
What made the vulnerabilities of the multiple-chancellor system
manifest were two ideological shifts. The first was a shift in the con-
ception of injunctions against federal officers, from thinking of them as
essentially antisuit to thinking of them as freestanding challenges to a
statute, regulation, or order. The second was a shift in the conception
of legal invalidity, from an invalid law being one a judge merely failed
to apply because a higher law controlled, to the conception of a judge
"striking down" and thus removing from operation an invalid law. In
addition to these two ideological shifts, there were other changes that
might have made national injunctions seem more natural: familiarity
with statutes that concentrated judicial review in a single court, greater
use of federal agency rulemaking and pre-enforcement challenges, and
renewed judicial confidence after Brown v. Board of Education.
The account given here - an institutional shift followed much later
by ideological changes that exploited its vulnerability - matters in sev-
eral ways, even apart from its intrinsic interest. One is that it suggests
the national injunction is relatively entrenched. It rests on structural
and ideological forces that will not soon be leaving the scene. That
suggestion will in turn shape the solution proposed in Part V. Another
way the explanatory account matters is that it reveals a difficulty in
translating traditional equitable doctrines for the present. Those doc-
trines were developed in a very different institutional setting - a one-
chancellor system - and so they need to be developed and refined with
awareness of the multiple-chancellor system of the federal courts.
169 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (195o). For a response to Llewellyn,
see Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 26-27
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
170 See Carroll, supra note 6, at 2033; see, e.g., Davis, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 868 (finding the conflict-
ing authority about the scope of an injunction "difficult to square").
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A. The Structural Precondition: Multiple Chancellors
Although Chancery began sometime around the Norman inva-
sion,171 only gradually did the Chancellor take on duties that were rec-
ognizably judicial. Through the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, it
became increasingly clear that Chancery was a court - a one-judge
court.17 2 True, the Chancellor was assisted by officers such as "masters"
and "registers." For judicial decisionmaking purposes, however,
Chancery was a unitary institution. It was the Chancellor who had to
sign all of the decrees; they were his decrees.'7 3 There was no appeal
from the Chancellor; his jurisdiction thus resembled, in more familiar
terms, the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United
States. This sense of Chancery as a unitary institution is captured, in
this Article, by saying that there was one Chancellor.17 4
The fact that there was one Chancellor was burdensome to those
who sought the Chancellor's aid, and to the Chancellor himself. For
example, the Chancellor had to make allowance for those who lived in
distant parts of England, because it would take so long for them to reach
the capital after being served with a subpoena.'7' And to ease the
171 See BAKER, supra note 8, at 99 & n.15.
172 On the growth of the Chancellor's English jurisdiction in the fourteenth century, see id. at
101-03. On the increasing significance of Chancery as a court in the fifteenth century, see P. TIcker,
The Early History of the Court of Chancery: A Comparative Study, 1i5 ENG. HIST. REV. 791, 791-
95 (2000).
173 For example, when Francis Bacon was Chancellor (1617-1621), he instructed the registers,
who drafted the decrees, that when they gave decrees to him for his signature, they "ought to give
him understanding which are [the] decrees of weight, that they may be read and reviewed before
his lordship sign them." FRANCIS BACON, Ordinances Made by the Lord Chancellor Bacon,
reprinted in 7 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 765 (James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis &
Douglas Denon Heath eds., London, Spottiswoode & Co. 1859) (Ordinance 41). Thus the press of
Chancery business meant the Chancellor would issue more decrees than he could read, but he was
still responsible for every decree. For a recent case emphasizing that federal judges should not cede
to masters the power to fill in the details of an injunction, see City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn
Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 145-46 (2d Cir. 2011).
174 Qualifications could be added. One is that the Chancellor retained his administrative duties,
which means that one could say that instead of one Chancellor there was only three-eighths of a
Chancellor. Another is that there were lesser courts of equity, including the Court of Requests and
the Court of Exchequer. The Court of Requests did not survive the seventeenth century, but the
Court of Exchequer had an equitable jurisdiction lasting into the nineteenth century, and it did
issue injunctions. See W.H. BRYSON, THE EQUITY SIDE OF THE EXCHEQUER II (1975); JOHN
H. LANGBEIN, RENtE LETTOw LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW 319-20 (2oo9). Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that "their use in Exchequer was minor
compared to that of Chancery, and did not shape the path along which injunctions were to develop."
David W. Raack, A History of Injunctions in England Before 17oo, 61 IND. L.J 539, 562 (1986).
s75 Cases in Tempore Egerton (Ch. c. 1599 x c. 1604), reprinted in I CASES CONCERNING EQ-
UITY AND THE COURTS OF EQUITY 1550-1660, at 318, 337 (W.H. Bryson ed., 2001) ("If a sub-
poena be sued forth against one that dwells two hundred miles from London, let the plaintiff have
this care, that the subpoena be returnable so as he may have the defendant come to London after
the rate of twenty miles a day."). Centuries later, in 1858, the cost and difficulty of traveling to see
the one Chancellor would again be discussed when there was a proposal to allow county courts to
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burden on the Chancellor, the early modern Chancery adopted many
rules that constrained or channeled would-be plaintiffs.'7 6
As England grew, as the common law courts grew, and as the various
other equitable courts grew, there remained only one Chancellor.177
Not until the nineteenth century, when Chancery was nearing the
end of its life as an independent judicial institution, did it receive Vice-
Chancellors who could also hear and decide cases.17s At that point
Chancery did have multiple judges, but it remained a small, unified, and
distinctive institution, and the power to issue equitable remedies was
not distributed throughout the English courts.
In colonial America, the one-chancellor system was imitated:
"[E]quity courts sat, as a rule, only in the capital; unlike the common
law, it was not brought to every man's doorstep."179 That pattern con-
tinued in the early Republic; a plaintiff who wanted to see Chancellor
Kent typically had to go to Albany.1 0
The late eighteenth century and the nineteenth century saw a shift
to multiple-chancellor systems. In federal courts of the new United
exercise equitable jurisdiction. Annual Report of the Councilfor the Session 1857-8, 5 LAW MAG.
& L. REV. 338, 342 (1858) ("[I]t cannot be doubted that distance from the metropolis often entails
on suitors, in many parts of the country, a denial of justice in matters taken cognizance of by a
Court of Equity alone . . . .').
176 Many of Bacon's ordinances are instructions to the parties to avoid burdening the court. The
grounds for a bill of review (in essence a motion for reconsideration of a Chancery decision) were
narrowly specified, BACON, supra note 173, at 759-60 (Ordinances 3 & 4), and any party seeking a
bill of review had to first obey the Chancellor's decree and obtain sureties for any "costs and dam-
ages for the delay" that might result, id. at 760 (Ordinance 5). Moreover, litigants were warned
about filing papers of "immoderate length," id. at 767 (Ordinance 55), offering evasive answers,
id. at 767-68 (Ordinances 61 & 63), introducing depositions from unrelated litigation, id. at 769
(Ordinance 7'), and attacking the credibility of witnesses, id. (Ordinance 72). Any plaintiff who
brought a suit in Chancery without having "probabilem causam litigandi," id. at 766, had to "pay
unto the defendant his utmost costs," id. at 767 (Ordinance 54). Once the Chancellor had decided,
orders were not to be "explained upon any private petition, but in court as they are made." Id. at
764 (Ordinance 37).
177 As with many aspects of the English political order, there was an exception during the
Interregnum between Charles I and Charles II, when the Puritans replaced the Chancellor with a
commission but could not, despite repeated efforts, rid themselves of Chancery. Stanley N. Katz,
The Politics of Law in Colonial America: Controversies over Chancery Courts and Equity Law in
the Eighteenth Century, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 255, 260-61 (Donald Fleming & Bernard
Bailyn eds., 197 ).
178 D.M. KERLY, AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE
COURT OF CHANCERY 272 (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press 18go). Vice-Chancellors were
added only after Lord Eldon, the most dilatory of the Chancellors and the inspiration for Dickens's
caricature. Id. at 270-71. On Dickens's depiction of Chancery in Bleak House, see M.J. LEEMING,
Five Judicature Fallacies, in i HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF AUSTRALIAN LAW 169, 171-72
(J.T. Gleeson, JA. Watson & R.C.A. Higgins eds., 2013).
179 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 48 (1973)
1s0 See John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 547, 562-63 (1993) ("In New York, as in England, Chancery was a one-judge court. The
Chancellor had his permanent seat in Albany but convened the court twice a year in New York
City.").
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States, from the beginning every judge was a Chancellor (that is, every
judge could resolve equitable claims on the court's equity side).'8 ' Most
of the states subsequently distributed equitable powers throughout the
judiciary.18 2
In the New York state courts of the nineteenth century, it was the
change to multiple Chancellors that allowed the robber barons battling
for control of the Erie Railroad to obtain conflicting injunctions.'8 3 In
the standard account, by President John Quincy Adams's grandson, the
blame is squarely put on the multiple Chancellors of 186os New York.
The state was divided into eight districts, each with four or five elected
judges.184 Adams writes:
These local judges, however, are clothed with certain equity powers in ac-
tions commenced before them, which run throughout the State. As one
subject of litigation, therefore, might affect many individuals, each of whom
might initiate legal proceedings before any of the thirty-three judges; which
judge, again, might forbid proceedings before any or all of the other judges,
or issue a stay of proceedings in suits already commenced, and then proceed
to make orders, to consolidate actions, and to issue process for contempt, -
it was not improbable that, sooner or later, strange and disgraceful conflicts
of authority would arise, and that the law would fall into contempt. 185
What Charles F. Adams, Jr., describes was not inevitable. The
multiple-chancellor system does not lead inexorably to problems such
as forum shopping and conflicting injunctions. But it is a necessary
precondition.
B. Two Ideological Shifts
Why did it take a century and a half after the establishment of the
federal courts before the national injunction arrived? The question is
181 See Samuel L. Bray, Equity: Notes on the American Reception, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUN-
DATIONS OF THE LAW OF EQUITY (Dennis Klimchuck, Irit Samet & Henry Smith eds., forth-
coming 2018) (manuscript at 7-8). In states without courts of equity at the Founding, the federal
courts would have been the only source of equitable relief. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Indispens-
able Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1254, 1277 (ig6i).
182 A summary of the current state of merger of legal and equitable courts in the states can be
found in Bray, supra note 140, at 538. For an exemplary study, see Kellen Funk, Equity Without
Chancery: The Fusion of Law and Equity in the Field Code of Civil Procedure, New York 1846-76,
36 J. LEGAL HIST. 152 (2015).
183 C.E Adams, Jr., A Chapter of Erie, in CHARLES F. ADAMS JR. & HENRY ADAMS, CHAP-
TERS OF ERIE AND OTHER ESSAYS I-99 (New York, Henry Holt & Co. 1886). I am grateful to
Professor Andrew Kull for directing me to A Chapter of Erie. For further discussion, see infra note
267 and accompanying text.
184 Adams, supra note 183, at 22.
185 Id. at 22-23. Although not exactly a case of conflicting injunctions, in Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (igo8), after a federal court issued a temporary injunction prohibiting the Minnesota
Attorney General from enforcing a rate regulation against the railroad in which the plaintiffs were
stockholders, that Attorney General obtained a writ of mandamus requiring the corporation to
comply, id. at 132-34.
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difficult, and the answer here is tentative. With enough judicial re-
straint or certain ideological views about courts and law, the vulnerabil-
ities of the multiple-chancellor structure would not have been exposed.
Yet two ideological shifts - in the sense of changes in thinking about
law - made it easier for federal judges to grant national injunctions.18 6
First, judges once thought of injunctions against enforcement not as
challenges to the validity of a statute (something offensive) as much as
antisuit injunctions (something defensive).187 A plaintiff seeking an in-
junction against public officials would be trying to forestall an enforce-
ment action in which the parties would be reversed.'8 8 (That is, the
plaintiff seeking an injunction would otherwise have been the defendant
in the hypothetical future enforcement action.) The court would decide
the validity of a law being applied, but only when there was, and only
to the extent that there was, a threatened enforcement action.18 9
The contrast can be overstated, because even as a court granted an
antisuit injunction, its rationale for doing so might be that the law was
invalid - invalid for general reasons, not for plaintiff-specific rea-
sons.'90 And modern standing doctrine does require an injury to the
186 In addition to the explanations given in this section, a number of others could be given. These
might include the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the 1962 statute
authorizing mandamus for federal district court judges, Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, Pub. L.
No. 87-748, § (a), 76 Stat. 744, 744 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2012)).
187 "Antisuit injunction" is the conventional terminology, see, e.g., John Harrison, Ex Parte
Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989 (2008), and so it is used here. It is not quite precise, as the Georgia
v. Atkins case shows. See supra pp. 428-29. In that case the injunction did not restrain Mr. Atkins
from bringing a suit, but rather from "further proceeding in the collection of the [tax]," which he
planned to do by means of a distress warrant. Georgia v. Atkins, so F. Cas. 241, 241 (C.C.N.D. Ga.
1866) (No. 5350). A broader term such as "anti-enforcement injunction" might be more precise,
though it would lose the useful connotation of particular proceedings that is implicit in suit.
188 A small but telling example of this perspective is a heading in WALTER WHEELER COOK,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUITY (M.T. Van Hecke ed., 4 th ed. 1948): not "Challenges to Stat-
utes" but "Immunity from Statutory Control," id. at 236.
189 Cf White v. Johnson, 282 U.S. 367, 373 (1931) ("An answer [to the fourth certified question]
would involve merely an examination of the Act and a determination whether on its face it violates
the Fifth Amendment. Neither this Court nor the court below is authorized to answer academic
questions. The constitutionality of a statute is not drawn into question except in connection with
its application to some person, natural or artificial."); Frothingham, 262 U.S. 447, 488-89 (1923)
("Looking through forms of words to the substance of their complaint, it is merely that officials of
the executive department of the government are executing and will execute an act of Congress
asserted to be unconstitutional . . . ." Id. at 488.); Fitts v. McGhee, I72 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1899)
("There is a wide difference between a suit against individuals, holding official positions under a
State, to prevent them, under the sanction of an unconstitutional statute, from committing by some
positive act a wrong or trespass, and a suit against officers of a State merely to test the constitu-
tionality of a state statute, in the enforcement of which those officers will act only by formal judicial
proceedings in the courts of the State."); New Orleans Water Works Co. v. New Orleans, 164 U.S.
471, 481 (1896) ("If an ordinance be passed and is invalid, the jurisdiction of the courts may then
be invoked for the protection of private rights that may be violated by its enforcement.").
190 In older cases there are some rather thorough statements about an unconstitutional act not
being a law - it is "as inoperative as though it had never been passed." Norton v. Shelby County,
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plaintiff. But the older antisuit view was not merely about injury, as
can be seen in Frothingham:
The party who invokes the power must be able to show not only that the
statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely
that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.'9'
That is, it is not merely that the plaintiff is injured ("he suffers"), but
that there is a threat of enforcement against him, and it is the threatened
enforcement that the injunction is meant to prevent. Antisuit thinking
about the injunction ran deeper than a mere requirement of injury.
To the extent federal courts thought of injunctions against the en-
forcement of statutes in antisuit terms,192 it is easy to see why they would
not give national injunctions. The suit anticipates an enforcement ac-
tion against this plaintiff; the injunction should protect this plaintiff
from that enforcement action. A national injunction in an individual
action would be illogical, almost unthinkable.
No one has yet charted exactly when the shift occurred, this shift in
thinking of an injunction against enforcement of a federal law primarily
in antisuit terms to thinking of it primarily as a challenge to the law
itself. It is possible that the adoption in 1934 of the federal Declaratory
Judgment Act'93 encouraged this change in thinking.9 4 If so, then the
Act had the effect of broadening federal standing, exactly as Justice
Brandeis feared.195 And the timing of the Act's adoption would fit the
change in thinking from Frothingham to Flast. It may also be that this
shift was related to the development of the idea that there is an inde-
pendent category of "facial challenges."19 6
I18 U.S. 425, 442 (1886). To a reader now, that might sound like a statement about the effect when
a court declares a law unconstitutional. But it has less to do with judicial review than with natural
law: the unconstitutional act lacked legal force whether a court had spoken or not.
191 262 U.S. at 488 (emphasis added).
192 For recent literature on antisuit injunctions and Ex parte Young, see Harrison, supra note 187;
David L. Shapiro, Ex Parte Young and the Uses of History, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 69
(2011); and Stephen I. Vladeck, Douglas and the Fate of Ex Parte Young, I22 YALE L.J. ONLINE
13 (2012).
193 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (2012).
194 By its own terms, the Declaratory Judgment Act should not have had this effect. See John
Harrison, Severability, Remedies, and Constitutional Adjudication, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56, 82
n.130 (2014).
195 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE,
THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA 124-28, 155 (2000).
196 Cf Alfred Hill, Some Realism About Facial Invalidation of Statutes, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV.
647, 653, 655-5 7 & n.38, 682 (2002) ("Taditionally, facial invalidation meant simply that statutory
language was struck down as written. Further, the holding was understood to apply only to the
rights of the successful itigant." Id. at 682.). For a qualified critique of the idea of facial challenges,
see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Commentary, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Stand-
ing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321 (2000).
450 [Vol. 131:417
2017] MULTIPLE CHANCELLORS 451
Second, there has been a change for some judges in their self-
conception of what they are doing vis-h-vis an unconstitutional statute.
The traditional conception is that a judge does not so much strike down
an unconstitutional law as refuse to apply it.197 A judge has a duty to
follow the law.'98 Where there is a conflict among legal authorities, that
duty compels the judge to follow the higher law. When a statute is
"repugnant"'99 to the Constitution, that is, when a statute is inconsistent
with the Constitution, a judge simply does not apply it. This view is
represented by Marbury v. Madison.2 0 0
A different view is common today, and it can be found in the meta-
phorical language of courts and commentators. We speak of a statute,
regulation, or order being "struck down," words that are physical and
violent.201 Such language has accompanied a shift in the idea of what
courts do with an unconstitutional statute. Instead of seeing courts as
preventing or remedying a specific wrong to a person and only inci-
dentally determining the constitutionality of a law, 20 2 now many see
courts as determining the constitutionality of a law and only incidentally
preventing or remedying a specific wrong to a person.2 0 3 For this view,
too, appeal is made to Marbury.204
197 E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 296-97 (1936) (stating that a federal court, being
"required to ascertain and apply the law to the facts in every case or proceeding properly brought
for adjudication, must apply the supreme law and reject the inferior statute whenever the two
conflict"); Howard v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. (The Employers' Liability Cases), 207 U.S. 463, 504 (19o8)
("[W]e are of the opinion that the courts below rightly held the statute to be repugnant to the
Constitution and non-enforcible . ... ."). See generally Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of
Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502 (2006); Harrison, supra note 194; Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Un-
constitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738 (2olo).
198 See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008).
199 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
200 See id. at 178 (calling it "of the very essence of judicial duty," when a law and constitution
conflict, to "determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case"); Bilder, supra note 197, at
560; Harrison, supra note 194, at 85-86.
201 Cf LEONARD COHEN, I'm Your Man, on I'M YOUR MAN (Columbia Records 1988) ("[I]f
you want to strike me down in anger / Here I stand").
202 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 96, at 93.
203 Compare United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960) ("This Court, as is the case with all
federal courts, 'has no jurisdiction to pronounce any statute, either of a State or of the United States,
void, because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is called upon to adjudge the legal
rights of litigants in actual controversies."' (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm'rs
of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885))), and Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (19iI) ("The
right to declare a law unconstitutional arises because an act of Congress relied upon by one or the
other of such parties in determining their rights is in conflict with the fundamental law."), with
Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1365-
71 (1973) (arguing that the Court has the "special function," id. at 1370, to render judgments in
constitutional litigation regardless of whether private rights are implicated).
204 See Monaghan, supra note 203, at 1370 ("Marbury itself provides the basis for a different
model of judicial competence."). Professor Henry Monaghan charts the shifting reception: "In im-
portant part, Marbury found the power of constitutional exposition to be an incident of the Court's
obligation to decide the particular 'case or controversy' before it. Thus, constitutional litigation
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That shift matters for the logic of the national injunction. If a court
considers a statute inconsistent with the Constitution, and thus does not
apply it, nothing follows about the remedy. The court has not done
anything to the statute. It remains undisturbed. But on the newer con-
ception of what a court does - striking down or setting aside an uncon-
stitutional statute or unlawful regulation - a national injunction begins
to have a relentless logic. 2 0 5 If a court strikes down a statute, regulation,
or order, why should it give it respect by allowing its continued enforce-
ment? Wouldn't enforcement, anywhere, offend the court's determina-
tion that it was invalid, struck down, obliterated? If a law is unconsti-
tutional in all its applications,20 6 why should the court permit it to be
applied to anyone? Again, reasons can be given for stopping short -
ones grounded in equitable remedies, judicial competence, humility, sep-
aration of powers, federalism, and so on. But the logic of the national
injunction is certainly strengthened by the newer view of what judges
do when one law is inconsistent with a higher one, as well as by the
metaphorical language used to express that view.
C. Other Changes?
In addition to these ideological shifts, there were other changes in
the twentieth century that might have made the national injunction
begin to seem natural. Three are considered here: statutes concentrating
judicial power in a single court or circuit, greater use of rulemaking by
federal agencies and pre-enforcement review of that rulemaking, and
renewed judicial confidence after Brown v. Board of Education2 07 and
Cooper v. Aaron.208 These changes may offer explanation and context
was viewed as essentially no different from any other adjudication." Id. at 1365 (footnote omitted).
But, Monaghan adds, "the case is now taken to have established that the Court's constitutional
interpretations are final and authoritative." Id.
205 See Fallon, supra note 196, at 1339 (making a similar point about the misleading implications
of saying that courts "invalidat[e]" unconstitutional statutes); Hill, supra note 196, at 683 ("Much
confusion would be avoided if it were recognized that courts only adjudicate the rights of litigants,
and are not in the business of killing or mutilating statutes."). An example is Justice Blackmun's
dissent in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). From the premise of what a
judge does to an agency action - "the rule is invalidated" - Justice Blackmun moved quickly to
the scope of the remedy: "Under these circumstances a single plaintiff, so long as he is injured by
the rule, may obtain 'programmatic' relief that affects the rights of parties not before the court."
Id. at 913 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The majority's response was opaque. Id. at 890 n.2 (majority
opinion); cf Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 Fq3d 1399, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(Williams, J.) (concluding that Justice Blackmun was "apparently expressing the view of all nine
Justices on this question').
206 The conventional definition of facial challenges is that they are "ones seeking to have a statute
declared unconstitutional in all possible applications," while all other challenges are considered as-
applied. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915,
923 (2011). Other definitions are possible, but the conventional one is used here.
207 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
208 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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for the development of the national injunction, but none offers
justification.
First, in the twentieth century, a number of statutes concentrated
judicial review in a single court or circuit.209  It could be that these
statutes led judges, lawyers, and scholars to think of a single court's
decree as controlling the federal government's conduct against every-
one.210 Moreover, the consequences of national injunctions are much
less dire if they are issued by a single court in which judicial review has
been concentrated: no forum shopping, because the cases must be
brought in that court; no lost percolation, because the choice has already
been made against percolation with the one-court structure; and little
risk of conflicting injunctions, because all of the injunctions will issue
from the same court.
But the concentration of judicial review does not neatly explain the
rise of the national injunction. Review of the orders of the Interstate
Commerce Commission was concentrated in a single court from 1911 to
1913, long before there were national injunctions.211 The affirmance of
a national injunction in Harlem Valley Transportation Association v.
Stafford in 1974 seems to have been the breakthrough in judicial prac-
tice, and it was the work of a generalist court. Nor do these statutes
support an inference that federal district courts should now issue na-
tional injunctions. In fact, the reverse is true. Congress knows how to
concentrate judicial review in a single court; when it has not chosen to
do so, a district court should not act as if Congress had made that choice.
Another change that might have led to national injunctions was an
increase in general rulemaking by federal agencies. A number of stat-
utes enacted in the 196os and 197os authorized general rulemaking, such
as the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,212 the Clean Air
Act,213 and the Clean Water Act. 2 14 At roughly the same time, Judge
Wright and Judge Friendly offered revisionist statutory interpretations
that gave several federal agencies legislative rulemaking. powers.2 15
209 David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action:
Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. I, 62-63 (1975).
210 Similarly, Congress required certain kinds of cases to be heard by three-judge courts. See
generally David P. Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1 (1964). For roughly the middle third of the twentieth century, a constitutional challenge
to a federal statute was heard by a threo-judge court, with a right of immediate appeal to the
Supreme Court, under a statute adopted in response to the myriad injunctions against enforcement
of New Deal statutes. See id. at io-in. Three-judge courts were abolished for most cases in 1976.
See Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450, 453 (2015).
211 Currie & Goodman, supra note 209, at 62.
212 Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (5966) (codified at 49 U.S.C. H§ 30101-30170 (2012)).
213 42 U.S.C. H 740-767iq (2012).
214 33 U.S.C. §H 1251-1387 (2012).
215 Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Orig-
inal Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 546-70 (2002).
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Meanwhile, as federal rulemaking expanded, the Supreme Court revised
its ripeness doctrines, making it easier to bring pre-enforcement chal-
lenges to agency action.2 16 And Congress joined in, encouraging pre-
enforcement review of agency actions.217 The total effect was to mark-
edly increase the number of pre-enforcement challenges.
Even so, it is not obvious that more rulemaking and more pre-
enforcement challenges have any logical implication for the scope of in-
junctions. It does seem that agencies now act more often in a legislative
mode, making general rules, rather than taking relatively specific ac-
tions such as setting rates for a railroad operating between Shreveport
and Dallas. But before the shift to national injunctions, there were
many statutes enacted by Congress. Those statutes could be challenged
before enforcement, with the litigant seeking an antisuit injunction or
what might be called an antisuit declaratory judgment.2 1 8 As already
discussed, there were many such challenges to New Deal legislation.2 1 9
But there were no national injunctions. Thus there is no logical or prac-
tical inconsistency between (a) plaintiff-protective injunctions and (b) a
large quantity of pre-enforcement challenges to generally applicable le-
gal norms.2 2 0
Yet another change that might have influenced the development of
the national injunction was the desegregation cases of the 1950s and
1960s. The impact of Brown v. Board of Education and Cooper v. Aaron
in dismantling Southern de jure segregation has been the subject of re-
visionist histories.2 2 1 As an idea, however, the influence of these cases
216 Professor Jerry Mashaw has described Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967),
as the case that established the general proposition "that preenforcement review of rules in an ap-
pellate form is appropriate general practice." Jerry L. Mashaw, Rethinking Judicial Review of
Administrative Action: A Nineteenth Century Perspective, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2241, 2252 & n.43
(2OI i).
217 See Paul R. Verkuil, Congressional Limitations on Judicial Review of Rules, 57 TUL. L. REV.
733, 734-35 (1983).
218 See EMILY SHERWIN & SAMUEL L. BRAY, AMES, CHAFEE, AND RE ON REMEDIES
(forthcoming 2017) (ch. io manuscript at 5 1-52, 55-56); Harrison, supra note 187, at iooo.
219 See supra PP. 433-35.
220 One way to distinguish challenges to agency rules from challenges to statutes might be the
Administrative Procedure Act, and in particular its statement that a federal court should "hold
unlawful and set aside" an invalid agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012) (emphasis added). What-
ever view should be taken of that provision, compare Duffy, supra note 13, with Ronald M. Levin,
"Vacation" at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE
L.J. 291 (2003), it does not explain the national injunction, which would not be embraced by the
federal courts until the 1970s, nearly three decades after the passage of the Act. For further discus-
sion, see supra note 12 1.
221 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SO-
CIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008); cf MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS:
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004). Moreover, much
of the civil rights movement happened outside the courts. See TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COUR-
AGE TO DISSENT. ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
(20II).
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is hard to overestimate. That idea includes not only the principle of
racial equality, but also the fact that it was federal judges who declared
that principle. The moral rightness of the desegregation cases seemingly
reshaped federal judges' self-conception of their remedial role. After the
Brown era, judges became more willing to give commands to federal
and state officers. After the Brown era, those officers became more will-
ing to follow the judges' commands.
Moreover, the desegregation decrees gave federal judges experience
with broader injunctions. As Southern officials engaged in massive re-
sistance to Brown, the personal cost of being a plaintiff was high.22 2
One solution was class actions; these may have encouraged judges to
think of desegregation injunctions in systemic terms. Another solution
was an injunction - in an individual suit - that went beyond the
plaintiff and desegregated the entire school district.2 23 Indeed, by 1972
the following view could be expressed in the treatise on federal courts
by Professors Charles Wright and Arthur Miller:
In most civil rights cases plaintiff seeks injunctive or declaratory relief
that will halt a discriminatory employment practice or that will strike down
a statute, rule, or ordinance on the ground that it is constitutionally offen-
sive. Whether plaintiff proceeds as an individual or on a class suit basis,
the requested relief generally will benefit not only the claimant but all other
persons subject to the practice or the rule under attack.2 2 4
To be certain, the authority Wright and Miller cited for this propo-
sition was thin.2 2 5 Still, some desegregation decrees did go beyond pro-
tecting the plaintiff.
222 See David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the
Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 68o n.134 (2oll).
223 A series of cases held that for challenges to racial discrimination, the injunctive relief granted
would be the same regardless of whether a class was certified. See, e.g., United Farmworkers of
Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 812 (sth Cir. 1974) ("[R]acial discrim-
ination is by definition class discrimination.").
224 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 1771, at 663-64 (1972); see also Sandford v. RL. Coleman Realty Co., 573 F.2d 173, 178 (4 th Cir.
1978) (quoting the last sentence of the block quote from Wright and Miller and calling it "the settled
rule"). For a contrary view from a commentator writing before Brown about desegregation cases,
see Comment, The Class Action Device in Antisegregation Cases, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 577, 578 (1953).
225 Of the five cases cited by Wright and Miller, the oldest and most important was Bailey v.
Patterson, 323 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1963). Bailey was a transportation desegregation case challenging
two Mississippi statutes and a Jackson, Mississippi, ordinance. It was decided almost a decade
after Brown, and it had already been to the U.S. Supreme Court, which had remanded "for expedi-
tious disposition." Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 34 (1962) (per curiam). On remand, the Fifth
Circuit recognized that the U.S. Supreme Court "specifically noted that this is a class action,"
Bailey, 323 F.2d at 206, yet the Fifth Circuit thought it "unnecessary to determine ... whether this
action was properly brought under Rule 23(a)." Id. Any injunction would have the same scope,
the court said, because of the right at issue: "Appellants . . . seek the right to use facilities which
have been desegregated, that is, which are open to all persons, appellants and others, without regard
to race. The very nature of the rights appellants seek to vindicate requires that the decree run to
the benefit not only of appellants but also for all persons similarly situated." Id. Of the four other
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Yet there are also reasons to doubt that desegregation decrees led
directly to national injunctions. The geographic scope of the injunc-
tions, when they went beyond the plaintiffs, was usually the school dis-
trict, not anything like the entire nation. An injunction against a school
or a school district has a much firmer basis in traditional equity: it is
easier to analogize such an injunction to the bill of peace, given its small
scale, the preexisting social group, and the impersonal quality of the
claims.22 6 Moreover, when courts gave these injunctions, the details of
the particular school district's history of legal segregation mattered, a
fact which is hard to square with a relatively coarse-grained national
injunction.
Finally, there is the impact of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 Of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Among the changes was the ad-
dition of the Rule 23(b)(2) class action - a class action for injunctive
and declaratory relief that was especially meant for civil rights cases.2 27
There is something logically odd about Rule 23(b)(2) leading to broader
injunctions in non--class actions. One would have thought the implica-
tion was the reverse: because there was express authorization for class
actions that could secure injunctive relief for a class of plaintiffs, there
was less need for broad injunctions in non-class actions. Nevertheless
it is at least possible that the practical effect of the 1966 amendments
was to make judges more familiar with injunctions that protected a
large class of plaintiffs, and then, more familiar with such injunctions,
judges were willing to give them even in non-class actions.
Thus each of these additional explanations - statutes concentrating
judicial review, the rise of general rulemaking, and judicial confi-
dence - is insufficient on its own. Yet together they may have contrib-
uted to the conceptual shifts discussed above. A steady increase in gen-
eral rules, and in pre-enforcement challenges to those rules, makes it
easier for courts and litigants to think of challenges as "facial" instead
of as fending off a threatened enforcement action. And a judiciary that
got Brown right could be more self-assured and more willing to declaim
on issues and not merely decide cases.
In short, the rise of the national injunction seems to have been grad-
ual and unplanned. The best understanding of the evidence is that the
national injunction went from being unthinkable to being thinkable
cases cited by Wright and Miller, three were class actions, Unemployed Workers Union v. Hackett,
332 F. Supp. 1372 (D.R.I. 1971); Moss v. Lane Co., 50 F.R.D. 122 (W.D. Va. 1970); Snyder v. Bd. of
Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 286 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Ill. 1968), and one was an individual action under
Title VII, Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
226 On the bill of peace, see supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text. For suits to remedy racial
discrimination, some courts and commentators emphasize the distinctive "group character of the
underlying substantive claim." OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 15 (1978).
227 See generally Marcus, supra note 222.
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without any sharp turns or decisive moments. What made it thinkable
was not a single unifying cause,228 but rather shifts in how judges
thought about legal challenges and invalid laws, accompanied by
changes in agency practice and new reasons for judicial confidence.
One implication of this account, contrary to the Principles of the Law
of Aggregate Litigation recently published by the American Law
Institute, is that there is nothing "indivisible" about an injunction re-
straining the enforcement of a statute, regulation, or order.2 2 9 Protecting
nonparties with an injunction is a remedial choice. It is a relatively new
choice, and like all remedial choices, it needs to be justified.
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE NATIONAL INJUNCTION
The choice to give a national injunction is increasingly shaping the
policies of the United States. This Part explores the consequences of the
national injunction - in particular the temptation of forum shopping,
the likely impact on judicial decisionmaking, the risk of conflicting in-
junctions, and the tension between the national injunction and other
doctrines and practices.
A. The Incentive to Forum Shop
National injunctions have increasingly thwarted the policies of the
Federal Executive. When George W. Bush was President, national in-
junctions against the Administration's regulatory initiatives were issued
by district court judges in California. For example, the Sierra Club and
other plaintiffs challenged Bush Administration Forest Service regula-
tions in Earth Island Institute v. Pengilly.2 3 0  The district court held
several of the regulations invalid, enjoining their operation.2 3 1 After
separate briefing directly on the scope of the court's order, the court
insisted on giving a national injunction.2 3 2 "The appropriate remedy,"
the court concluded, "is to prevent such injury from occurring again by
the operation of the invalidated regulations, be it in the Eastern District
of California, another district within the Ninth Circuit, or anywhere else
228 Cf JACQUES BARZUN, The Fallacy of the Single Cause, in THE CULTURE WE DESERVE
129, 132-33 (Arthur Krystal ed., 1989) (noting, with respect to historical developments, the recurrent
"urge to find the single cause," id. at 133).
229 Contra PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 22, § 2.04 cmt.
a, at 117-19; Walker, supra note 6, at 1141 ("If a plaintiff successfully challenges a rule of 'broad
applicability,' then the relief, the invalidation of the rule, will naturally extend to persons beyond
the named plaintiffs.").
230 376 F. Supp. 2d 994 (E.D. Cal. 2005).
231 Id. at ioiI; Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, No. CIV F-o3-6386, 2005 WL 5280466, at *I-
2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2005) (discussing scope of injunction on motion to clarify and amend).
232 For another national injunction, see California ex rel. Lockyer v. United States Department
of Agriculture, 468 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1142-44 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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in the nation."2 33 The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's national
injunction, and it went even further, concluding that once the district
court had found the regulations invalid, a national injunction was actu-
ally "compelled by the text of the Administrative Procedure Act," 2 3 4 be-
cause the Act requires a court to "hold unlawful and set aside agency
action" found to be invalid. 2 35
Near the end of the Obama Administration, national injunctions ty-
mied many of the President's policies. Most prominent was the injunc-
tion in Texas v. United States, a case brought by Texas and a number of
other states to challenge an immigration program, "Deferred Action for
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents," which gave
lawful presence to millions of aliens for various federal-law purposes.2 3 6
The district court concluded that the program was likely a violation of
the Administrative Procedure Act.2 37 The district court also concluded
that a preliminary injunction should be issued halting the implementa-
tion of the program.238 But what would be the scope of that remedy?
The court enjoined implementation for everyone, not just with respect
to the twenty-six states that were plaintiffs.239 That preliminary injunc-
tion was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, and by an evenly divided U.S.
Supreme Court.2 4 0
Texas v. United States was not a unique challenge to the policies of
the Obama Administration. In 2ol6, a district court judge issued a na-
tional preliminary injunction against a major Department of Labor reg-
ulation, the "persuader rule." 2 4 1 Another issued a national preliminary
injunction regarding a "Dear Colleague" letter from the Department of
Education about the statutory term "sex" and public school restrooms.2 4 2
Another issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of a regu-
lation requiring federal contractors to report labor violations.2 4 3  An-
other issued a national preliminary injunction against the enforcement
233 Earth Island Inst., 2005 WL 5280466, at *2.
234 Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 699 (9th Cir. 2007).
235 Id. (some emphasis omitted) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012)), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 501 (2009) (declining to reach the question
whether "a nationwide injunction would be appropriate'). On the APA argument, see supra note
121.
236 Texas v. United States, 86 E Supp. 3d 591, 604 (S.D. Tex.), aff'd, 809 F 3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2026) (mem.).
237 Id. at 671.
238 Id. at 676.
239 See id.
240 Texas v. United States, 8og E3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), affd by an equally divided Court, 136 S.
Ct. 2271 (2026) (mem.).
241 Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Perez, No. 5:i6-cv-ooo66, 2o6 WL 3766121, at *46 (N.D. Tex.
June 27, 2016).
242 Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 81o, 835-36 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
243 Associated Builders & Contractors of Se. Tex. v. Rung, No. I:i6-CV- 425, 2026 WL 8188655,
at *15 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2016).
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of a Department of Labor regulation that would have made about four
million workers eligible for overtime pay.244 Still another issued a na-
tional preliminary injunction against a rule interpreting an antidiscrim-
ination provision in the Affordable Care Act (ACA). 245 These national
injunctions were all issued against a Democratic administration by fed-
eral district court judges in Texas.246
At the start of the Trump Administration, the President's executive
order restricting entry to the United States from seven countries was
blocked by a federal district judge in the State of Washington, who is-
sued a national preliminary injunction.247 Other district judges also is-
sued national preliminary injunctions against the original or later ver-
sions of the order.2 48 Another district court issued a national preliminary
injunction against an executive order on "sanctuary cities."249 In an-
other challenge to the Administration's policies on "sanctuary cities," a
district court issued a national preliminary injunction against grant con-
ditions imposed by the Attorney General.250 In another case, involving
representation in immigration proceedings, a district court blocked the
enforcement of a cease-and-desist order with a national preliminary in-
junction.251 All these national injunctions came in the first eight months
of the Trump Administration.
It is no accident which courts have given the major national
injunctions in the last three administrations. In the George W. Bush
Administration, it was federal courts in California. In the Obama
244 Nevada v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 2T8 F. Supp. 3 d 520, 533-34 (E.D. TeX. 2016).
245 Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3 d 660, 695 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
246 In addition, a Sixth Circuit stay of the Clean Water Rule, which was adopted in 2015 by the
Environmental Protection Agency, was in effect a national preliminary injunction. See In re EPA,
803 F.3 d 804, 808-09 (6th Cir. 2015).
247 Washington v. rump, No. C17-o41, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017). The dis-
trict court gave a temporary restraining order that was treated by the Ninth Circuit as an appealable
preliminary injunction. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3 d 1151, 1158 (9 th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
248 Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17-00050, 2017 WL 4639560, at *14 (D. Haw. Oct. 17, 2017) (granting
temporary restraining order), appeal docketed, No. 17-17168 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 2017); Int'l Refugee
Assistance Project v. Trump, No. 17-0361, 2017 WL 4674314, at *40-41 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017); Int'l
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. SuPP. 3 d 529, 566 (D. Md. 2017), affd in part, vacated
in part, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017) (mem.)
(per curiam); Hawai'i v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1237-39 (D. Haw. 2017), affd in part, vacated
in part, 859 F.3 d 741 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 85 U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Oct. 
24, 2017) (NO.
16-1540); Darweesh v. 'Tump, 17 Civ. 480, 2017 WL 388504, at *i (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017).
249 County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
250 City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17 C 5720, 2017 WL 408182 1, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2017)
("This injunction against imposition of the notice and access conditions is nationwide in scope, there
being no reason to think that the legal issues present in this case are restricted to Chicago or that
the statutory authority given to the Attorney General would differ in another jurisdiction."); see
also City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17 C 5720, 2017 WL 4572208 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2017) (denying
stay of national injunction).
251 Nw. Immigrant Rights Project v. Sessions, No. C17-7l6, 2017 WL 3189032, at *6-7 (W.D.
Wash. July 27, 2017).
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Administration, it was federal courts in Texas. Now, in the Trump
Administration, the national preliminary injunctions have come from
federal courts in several less conservative circuits (the Fourth, Seventh,
and Ninth). The forum selection happens not only for the district court,
but also for the appellate court.2 52 The pattern is as obvious as it is
disconcerting. Given the sweeping power of the individual judge to
issue a national injunction, and the plaintiff's ability to select a forum,
it is unsurprising that there would be rampant forum shopping.2 5 3
The opportunity for forum shopping is extended by the asymmetric
effect of decisions upholding and invalidating a statute, regulation, or
order.254 If a plaintiff brings an individual action seeking a national
injunction, and the district judge upholds the challenged law, that deci-
sion has no effect on other potential plaintiffs. But if one district judge
invalidates it and issues a national injunction, the injunction controls
the defendant's actions with respect to everyone. Shop 'til the statute
drops.
Moreover, the potential effect of forum shopping for national injunc-
tions is even greater than in the cases already described. Consider as well
the cases in which district courts did not grant national injunctions but
could have, including the challenge to the ACA that eventually led to the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius .255 A federal district court judge in Florida held the
individual mandate unconstitutional, and also held that it could not be
severed.2 5 6 Having thus decided that the entire statute was unconstitu-
tional, the district court could have enjoined its enforcement. Indeed, the
twenty-six plaintiff states requested an injunction, and the court could
easily have concluded that enforcement of the statute should be enjoined
252 Note that if national injunctions were curtailed, there could still be forum shopping in indi-
vidual cases, as plaintiffs make use of the broad venue provisions for suits against the federal gov-
ernment. See Kate Huddleston, Nationwide Injunctions: Venue Considerations, 127 YALE L.J.F.
242, 246-49 (2017).
253 What does not seem to have happened yet, but may be the next development, is that potential
defendants would bring declaratory judgment actions or seek antisuit injunctions in order to do
their own forum shopping.
254 Other scholars have noted this asymmetry. See Carroll, supra note 6, at 2020-21; Morley, De
Facto Class Actions?, supra note 6, at 494 (calling it "asymmetric claim preclusion," though technically
the effect is derived from the injunction and not the preclusive effect of the judgment); see also Andrew
D. Bradt & Zachary D. Clopton, MDL v. 7Rump, 112 Nw. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (evaluating, and
ultimately rejecting, a possible solution to the forum-shopping problem, namely, consolidation under
the Multidistrict Litigation Act), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3014825 [https://perma.cclPJ7E-D2DB].
255 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
256 Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 780 F Supp. 2d 1256, 1306
(N.D. Fla.), order clarified, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla.), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (1ith Cir. 2011),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
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throughout the country.257 Moreover, the court could have been con-
cerned about evasion of its injunction, and thus further enjoined the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) from spending money
or allocating employees to work on plans for carrying out the putatively
unconstitutional statute. Holding constant the pace of subsequent ap-
peals, HHS would have lost seven and a half irreplaceable months for
preparing to roll out the regulations for the statute. But the district court
judge did not enjoin HHS. Instead he granted a declaratory judgment,
and he subsequently stayed the judgment until appeals were ex-
hausted.258 These were acts of judicial self-restraint, not judicial neces-
sity. It is far from clear, given the district court's holding, that it would
have been an abuse of discretion to enjoin all preparation for enforce-
ment of the ACA.259
B. The Effect on Judicial Decisionmaking
National injunctions interfere with good decisionmaking by the fed-
eral judiciary. When a district court grants a national injunction, that
choice affects the Supreme Court's resolution of a legal issue.
The district court's injunction may halt federal enforcement every-
where. There may be no opportunity, then, for more circuits to express
their views, because parties in other circuits might no longer bring their
own challenges to the statute, regulation, or order. The Supreme Court
is thus more likely to hear a case without the benefit of disagreement
from the courts of appeals. It is denied what Judge Leventhal famously
described as the "value in percolation among the circuits, with room for
a healthful difference that may balance the final result."260
Moreover, the Court's resolution may be accelerated and relatively
fact-free. If the district court's national injunction is issued before trial,
257 The Second Amended Complaint requested injunctive relief, but only as to enforcement
against the twenty-six plaintiff states and their citizens, residents, and officers. Second Amended
Complaint at 4, Bondi, 780 F Supp. 2d 1256 (No. 3:Io-cv-91)-
258 Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1307; Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1320. That declaratory judgment
was later the subject of a confused motion to clarify filed by the Department of Justice, as discussed
in Bray, supra note 143, at 1092-93.
259 Nor is it clear that the solution would have been stays of the injunction from the court of
appeals or the Supreme Court. The court of appeals agreed with the district court's decision about
the invalidity of the individual mandate, and even though in time it would find that provision
severable, it is not at all certain that it would have found an injunction to be an abuse of discretion.
In the Supreme Court, it is also not clear that there were five votes in 2011 to uphold the statute.
A majority of the Supreme Court might have declined to stay an injunction against the ACA, and
then that provisional commitment by five Justices might have led to the Court striking down the
individual mandate on the merits the following year. The psychological premise is simple: once a
Justice makes a decision about a preliminary injunction, it will be hard to reverse course on the
merits. See sources cited infra note 263.




and the defendant appeals to the Supreme Court for a stay of the pre-
liminary injunction, then the Supreme Court's decision will take place
without a record.2 6 1 It is true that the Court, in deciding a motion to
stay a preliminary injunction, is usually not deciding the merits, only
whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits.2 6 2 But it is natural
for a judge, like any other human being, having once accepted a posi-
tion, to stick to it.263
In a legal system that emphasizes the development of law through
cases and through distributed decisionmaking, it would be unfortunate
if the Court began to decide major constitutional questions not in order
to resolve circuit splits but instead to address stays of district court pre-
liminary injunctions. Indeed, that might have happened in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius if the district court had
behaved differently;264 it very nearly happened in Texas v. United
States265 and Washington v. Trump.2 66 A world of national injunctions
is one in which the Supreme Court will tend to decide important ques-
tions more quickly, with fewer facts, and without the benefit of contrary
opinions by lower courts.
C. The Risk of Conflicting Injunctions
The forum shopping and decisionmaking effects of the national in-
junction can obscure a less common but also potentially serious prob-
lem, namely, conflicting injunctions. The most colorful example in-
volves the battle for the control of the Erie Railroad in the late
nineteenth century. There were repeated instances of conflicting injunc-
tions, as multiple judges wielding equitable powers would give diverg-
ing commands to litigants, one judge mandating the sale of stock and
another judge prohibiting it.267
Nor are all the examples historical. At the very end of the Obama
Administration, two lawsuits were filed by immigrants not legally in the
United States challenging the scope of the district court injunction in
261 See Dan B. Dobbs, Should Security Be Required as a Pre-Condition to Provisional Injunc-
tive Relief?, 52 N.C. L. REV. 1091, IIII (1974) ("Procedure in provisional relief cases, far from
providing a rational process for development of, and reflection upon, law and fact, forces immediate
decisions without the light of fact or the delineation of policy.").
262 In some cases an appellate court even renders a final judgment while reviewing a preliminary
injunction. See LAYcOCK, supra note 6, at 469.
263 See In re Opinion of the Justices, 69 A. 627, 631 (Me. 1908) (opinion of Savage, J.) (recognizing
that an advisory opinion would not bind the Justices in a subsequent case, and adding: "Neverthe-
less it is my belief that, while human and judicial nature remain as we know them to be, the opinion
of the justices will quite likely be the judgment of the court."); cf Jean 0. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner,
Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions, 44 J.L. & ECON. 573, 587 (2001).
264 See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
265 See supra notes 236-40 and accompanying text.
266 See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
267 Adams, supra note 183, at 22-99.
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Texas v. United States.2 6 8 The plaintiffs in these two suits, one of which
was filed in the Eastern District of New York 269 and one in the Northern
District of Illinois, 2 7 0 sought declaratory judgments that the Texas in-
junction did not apply in New York and Illinois, respectively.27' The
plaintiffs also sought injunctions requiring the federal government to
ignore the Texas injunction in their own cases.2 7 2 In the New York case,
the judge even signaled his willingness to accept the plaintiff's argu-
ment, hinting that he might order the federal defendants to disregard
the injunction from the district court in Texas.27 3 If that had happened,
it might have been Erie Railroad all over again.
In less dramatic cases there have also been conflicting injunctions
issued to the same parties. Typically one judge or the other backs down,
narrowing or staying one of the issued injunctions, or else an appellate
court reverses one of them.274 But those decisions are exercises of self-
restraint. The risk of conflicting injunctions is still there, lurking in the
268 Daniel Denvir, New Hope for Undocumented Immigrants: DAPA Might Not Be Dead - A
Bold Legal Strategy Could Protect Millions from Deportation, SALON (Oct. 13, 2016, o:oo AM),
http://www.salon.com/2o6/io/3/new-hope-for-undocumented-immigrants-dapa-might-not-be-dead-
a-bold-legal-strategy-could-protect-millions-from-deportation/ [https://perma.cc/Q6LQ-ARWJ].
269 Complaint, Batalla Vidal v. Baran, No. i:i6-cv-o4756 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2016).
270 Complaint, Lopez v. Richardson, No. i:i6-cv-o9670 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2016).
271 Complaint, supra note 269, at 15; Complaint, supra note 270, at 18.
272 Complaint, supra note 269, at 15; Complaint, supra note 270, at 18.
273 One reporter wrote at the time:
Judge Garaufis seems inclined to Vidal's argument. In a pre-motion conference in
late September, he announced that he had "absolutely no intention of simply marching
behind in the parade that's going on out there in Texas, if this person has rights here."
"I sympathize with your problem," he told the government, "but I do not sympathize
with the idea that I am hamstrung in dealing with an issue involving individual rights
and including the right to go make a living and have a life as an immigrant in the United
States." How, he asked, could a judge in one jurisdiction "issue a nationwide injunction
if someone comes to him with a claim that affects the rights of people in" another juris-
diction "who have not been before the court?"
Denvir, supra note 268.
274 See, e.g., Feller v. Brock, 802 F.2d 722, 727-28 (4 th Cir. 1986) (vacating a preliminary injunc-
tion that directly conflicted with another court's injunction, on the grounds that the injunction
under review failed to preserve the status quo, failed to correctly apply the balance of hardships
doctrine, and disserved the public interest); California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 710
F. Supp. 2d 916, 921-24 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (partially staying an injunction that reinstated an agency
rule, in order to reduce the conflict with a subsequently issued injunction by another federal district
court that forbade the use of the rule); see also Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d in1g, 1124 (7th
Cir. 1987) ("Where different outcomes would place the defendant under inconsistent legal duties,
the case for the second court's not going into conflict with the first is particularly strong."); Nat'1
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Payless ShoeSource, Inc., No. C-ai-i89 2, 2012 WL
3277222, at *9 n.4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012) (declining to issue an injunction against litigation in
another federal district court out of concern, perhaps misplaced, that "conflicting injunctions [could]
make compliance with both an impossibility for the parties affected").
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background, and perhaps it will move quickly to the foreground. Con-
flicting injunctions can be avoided with judicial restraint and good luck,
but neither one is sure to last forever.2 7 5
D. The Doctrinal Inconsistencies
There are a number of doctrines and patterns of judicial deci-
sionmaking that are premised on the absence of national injunctions.
The availability of national injunctions allows a plaintiff suing a federal
defendant to make an end run around these doctrines and patterns.
Briefly consider four examples:
First, the doctrine of nonmutual offensive issue preclusion does not
apply against the federal government.27 6 That exception to ordinary
preclusion rules is meaningful as long as the remedy in a particular case
protects only the plaintiffs. But if national injunctions were to become
the norm, this doctrine would be vestigial.277
Second, Rule 2 3 (b)(2) makes a class-wide injunctive remedy avail-
able if certain conditions are met;278 the implication is that the remedy
is available only if those conditions are met. Nevertheless, the need for
and value of this class action provision is greatly diminished if plaintiffs
275 Charles F. Adams, Jr., made exactly this point about the Erie Railroad litigation:
Such a system can, in fact, be sustained only so long as co-ordinate judges use the delicate
powers of equity with a careful regard to private rights and the dignity of the law, and
therefore, more than any which has ever been devised, it calls for a high average of learn-
ing, dignity, and personal character in the occupants of the bench. When, therefore, the
ermine of the judge is flung into the kennel of party politics and becomes a part of the
spoils of political victory; when by any chance partisanship, brutality, and corruption be-
come the qualities which especially recommend the successful aspirant to judicial honors,
then the system described will be found to furnish peculiar facilities for the display of
these characteristics.
Adams, supra note 183, at 23.
276 United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1984). "Offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel
is a version of the doctrine that arises when a plaintiff seeks to estop a defendant from relitigating
an issue which the defendant previously litigated and lost against another plaintiff." Appling v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 340 F.3 d 769, 775 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added) (citing Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329 (1979)).
277 When issuing a national injunction, some courts explicitly distinguish Mendoza as pertaining
to preclusion, not injunctions. See, e.g., California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 468 F.
Supp. 2d 1140, Ir44 (N.D. Cal. 2o06); cf. Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145
F.3d 1399, 1409-10 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (recognizing that national injunctions "diminish[] the scope of
the [Mendoza] doctrine, under which the government may normally relitigate issues in multiple
circuits," id. at 1409, but affirming one anyway). But see Va. Soc'y for Human Life, Inc. v. FEC,
263 F.3 d 379, 392-94 (4 th Cir. 2001) (rejecting a national injunction in part because of the concerns
raised in Mendoza).
278 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (allowing class actions, assuming other requirements are met, if "the
party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so
that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as
a whole"). On the background of the provision, see Marcus, supra note 222.
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can get the same relief in an individual suit that they can in a class
action.27 9
Third, there is the power of plaintiffs to initiate contempt proceed-
ings. When a defendant violates an injunction, the plaintiff who suc-
ceeded in getting the injunction can try to enforce it with contempt.28 0
That rule is well suited to injunctions that protect only the plaintiff. But
it sits uneasily with injunctions that control the behavior of the defen-
dant toward nonparties. Nonparties cannot initiate civil contempt pro-
ceedings to enforce the injunction.2 8 1
Fourth, there are limitations on the power of a federal district court
to establish precedent. A federal district judge's decision does not bind
other district courts.28 2 Indeed, it is not even an authoritative precedent
for other judges in the same district court.28 3 Nor can a federal district
court decision assure "clearly established law" for purposes of qualified
immunity.28 4  Given these limitations on a federal district judge's au-
thority to recognize and determine the law for anyone but the parties, it
would be strange if a district judge could do so by means of a national
injunction.285
IV. THE FAILURE OF EXISTING LIMITS
Judicial decisions on when an injunction should be issued are recog-
nized by scholars to be a muddle of inconsistent generalizations. There
are relevant principles, but they are indeterminate and inconsistent with
one another.286 The permissibility of injunctions protecting nonparties
279 Cf John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419,
1433-34 (2003). In some cases the decision to bring a suit as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) Will
prevent its being moot, and the certification of a class can increase the number of plaintiffs who are
empowered to enforce the injunction. Carroll, supra note 6, at 2036, 2038.
280 Contempt proceedings may also be initiated by the court or a federal prosecutor.
281 Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444-45 (1911) ("Proceedings for civil
contempt are between the original parties . . . ."); Carroll, supra note 6, at 2038 ("[A] defendant in
an individual case might refuse to apply a system-wide remedy to anyone other than the plaintiff;
under those circumstances, the other potential claimants (as nonparties) would have no power to
enforce the injunction or declaration."); see also Ahearn ex rel. NLRB v. Int'l Longshore &
Warehouse Union, Locals 2I & 4, 721 .3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2013) (reversing award of com-
pensatory civil contempt to nonparties while raising qualifications to the general rule).
282 Fallon, supra note 196, at 1340 (noting that "even if the district court purported to hold the
statute invalid on its face, its holding would not bind other federal district courts in cases involving
other parties").
283 Threadgill v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 928 F2d 1366, 1371 (3d Cir. iggi).
284 See Jack M. Beermann, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance, 2009 SUP. CT.
REV. 139, 16o.
285 Another weakness of a geographic solution, see supra note 19, is that it would dramatically
increase the power of a federal district court to determine the law within a circuit.
286 Carroll, supra note 6, at 2033 ("In light of the variations and inconsistencies in the case
law . . . a plaintiff will likely be able to find authority supporting a grant of system-wide relief in a
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has never been squarely addressed by the Supreme Court.2 8 7 Among
lower court decisions, to the extent there is a theme, it is that federal
trial courts have broad discretion to award national injunctions
whenever they seem warranted. A trial court's decision to issue (or not
issue) a national injunction is then reviewed on appeal for abuse of
discretion.288
To be sure, the cases do have apparent constraints on the granting of
national injunctions. The one most commonly raised by courts and
commentators is the principle of "complete relief," which is that "injunc-
tive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than neces-
sary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs."28 9 This principle sug-
gests that when a national injunction is needed for complete relief a
court should award one, and when it is not needed for complete relief a
court should not award one. It is thus two sided, by turns a shield for
defendants and a sword for plaintiffs, depending on the case.29 0 The
complete-relief principle is intuitively appealing, and it suits the most
basic aim of the law of remedies: to put the plaintiff in her rightful
position.2 9 1
Nevertheless, despite its acceptance by courts and commentators,
the complete-relief principle is problematic. Complete relief is useful
as an aim. But it fails as a legal principle intended to have outcome-
determinative force. This conclusion is supported by three reasons.
non-class case, and a defendant will likely be able to find authority opposing it. The same will be
true of the district and appellate courts.").
287 The Court reserved the question in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 500-01
(2009). Some cases, such as Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), and Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433
(2009), are suggestive about the need to match the remedy to the plaintiff's harm, but they do not
squarely address the national injunction. On Horne v. Flores, see infra note 301.
288 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015) (reviewing national prelim-
inary injunction for abuse of discretion), affd by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 227l (2056)
(mem.).
289 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979); see LAYCOCK, supra note 6, at 275-76;
Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 6, at 5so. But cf Walker, supra note 6, at 135-37
(noting that Califano was a class action, and thus not entirely on point for the scope of injunctions
in nonclass cases). Although Califano attributes this statement to one of the litigants, 442 U.S. at
702, it has been widely accepted as an endorsement by the Court. For further invocation of "com-
plete relief" as a principle for the scope of an injunction, see, for example, Lewis, 518 U.S. at 359-
60; Los Angeles Haven Hospice, Inc. v. Sebelius, 638 F.3d 644, 664 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v.
AMC Entertainment, Inc., 549 F3d 760, 775 (9th Cir. 2008) (Wardlaw, J., dissenting in part); and
Meinhold v. United States Department of Defense, 34 F3d 1469, 1480 (9th Cir. 1994). Zayn
Siddique argues that the muddled and inconsistent decisions could be resolved if courts would "ex-
pressly adopt[] the requirement that a nationwide injunction should not issue unless it is necessary
to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs." Siddique, supra note 6 (manuscript at 40).
290 Cf Carroll, supra note 6, at 2031 & n.71 (noting this two-sided quality for the idea that the
remedy "should be commensurate with the scope of the violation," id. at 2031).
291 LAYCOCK, supra note 6, at 14-,5; see Lewis, 518 U.S. at 358 (finding the harm to a "plaintiff
in this lawsuit," rather than to other people, to be "the proper object of this District Court's reme-
diation"); Frothingham, 262 U.S. 447, 488-89 (1923).
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First, although complete relief is ostensibly a limiting principle, the
idea actually contributes to the general availability of the national in-
junction. What counts as complete relief will often be indeterminate, as
even supporters of this principle acknowledge.2 9 2 To get past this inde-
terminacy, a frequent move in judicial opinions is to look to the "extent
of the violation."2 9 3 That inquiry seems innocuous, for it is a truism that
the remedy should match the violation.2 9 4
But the move is actually consequential; it drains the complete-relief
principle of any limiting power. The question of whether to issue a
national injunction arises precisely because the extent of the violation -
the unconstitutional statute or the unlawful regulation or executive or-
der - is national. The extent of the violation is national and so (courts
reason) to give complete relief the injunction should also be national.2 95
In this way, the complete-relief principle can be taken by courts as a
constraint on national injunctions or an impetus to give them, which is
to say that it is no constraint at all. 2 9 6
Second, by the point in time at which the court decides what might
be needed for complete relief, there is already a tilt to the analysis. An
injunction is often drafted in the first instance by the prevailing party,
and though it should be scrutinized and revised by the judge, in this
292 See Siddique, supra note 6 (manuscript at 42).
293 AMC Entertainment, 549 F.3d at 775 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Califano, 442
U.S. at 702); see also, e.g., id. ("[D]istrict courts within our circuit commonly issue nationwide in-
junctions where the 'injunction . . . is tailored to the violation of law that the Court already
found - an injunction that is no broader but also no narrower than necessary to remedy the vio-
lations."' (second alteration in original) (quoting California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.,
468 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1144 (N.D. Cal. 2006))); City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17 C 5720, 2017 WL
4572208, at *I-2, *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2017); Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 81o, 836 (N.D.
Tex. 2056); Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Perez, No. 5:i6-CV-ooo66, 20I6 WL 376612 1, at *46 (N.D.
Tex. June 27, 2016); Davis v. Astrue, 874 F. Supp. 2d 856, 868-69 (N.D. Cal. 2012). The same
consideration is invoked in cases involving injunctions against state officers that run beyond the
parties. See, e.g., Clement v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 364 F.3 d 1148, IT52-54 (9th Cir. 2004).
294 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 16 (1971) ("As with any equity
case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy.'). On the human impulse
behind that doctrinal norm, see generally WILLIAM IAN MILLER, EYE FOR AN EYE (2006).
295 E.g., City of Chicago, 2017 WL 4572208, at *2; Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241
F. Supp. 3d 529, 566 (D. Md. 2017) ("Here, nationwide relief is appropriate because this case in-
volves an alleged violation of the Establishment Clause by the federal government manifested in
immigration policy with nationwide effect."), affd in part, vacated in part, 857 F.3d 554 (4 th Cir.),
vacated and remanded, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017) (mem.) (per curiam).
296 Compare Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 728 n.i (9th Cir. 1983) (vacating national preliminary
injunction because "[s]uch broad relief is not necessary to remedy the rights of the individual plain-
tiffs"), with Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1170-71 (9 th Cir. 1987) (affirming national injunction,
and concluding that "an injunction is not necessarily made overbroad by extending benefit or pro-
tection to persons other than prevailing parties in the lawsuit - even if it is not a class action - if
such breadth is necessary to give prevailing parties the relief to which they are entitled" (citing
Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 472 F. 2d 631, 633-34 (9 th Cir. 1972))). For recognition that the same
indeterminate principles are invoked for and against injunctions that control the defendant's con-
duct against nonparties, see Walker, supra note 6, at 1142.
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practice there is a bias toward broader relief. Moreover, the judge de-
cides the scope of a permanent injunction only after finding that the
defendant was liable. It is probably unavoidable that remedial decisions
are made after liability decisions, but that fact again means that a
judicial decision about complete relief is skewed toward a broader
injunction.
Finally, the complete-relief principle hardens the remedial choices of
equity, treating the equitable remedy as corresponding precisely to the
underlying right. To the contrary, the scope of an equitable remedy is
not at all automatic. There are a number of situations in which equita-
ble remedies go beyond, or stop short of, the strict right of the plain-
tiff.2 97 Equity is concerned with justice not only for the plaintiff but
also for the defendant.298 Complete relief is thus the starting point for
equitable relief, but it is not and never has been the sole desideratum
for the scope of equitable remedies.2 9 9
For these reasons it should be unsurprising that the complete-relief
principle can coexist easily with national injunctions. It is not an effec-
tive limit. This is not to say it is a misguided idea. The complete-relief
principle would be reasonable if it were treated as an equitable maxim.
Like other maxims, it could focus judicial attention on an important aim
or concern for equitable remedies.3 0 0  But a useful maxim is not the
same thing as a limiting principle. Existing doctrine cannot solve the
problem of the national injunction.3 0 1
297 See, e.g, Golden, supra note 27 (injunctions in patent law); David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure of
an Injunction: A Principle to Replace Balancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L.
REV. 627 (1988) (injunctions generally); Ttacy A. Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Prin-
ciples and Definitional Parameters of Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 301 (2004) (prophy-
lactic injunctions); see also 'luax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 343 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[With-
out legalizing the conduct complained of the extraordinary relief by injunction may be denied .... ").
Nevertheless, influential scholarship has treated injunctions as if they were effectively automatic in
scope, being coextensive with the plaintiff's right E.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Prop-
erty Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 192,
i i16, ii18, 1I21 (1972). But see Samuel L. Bray, Remedies, Meet Economics; Economics, Meet Rem-
edies, OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming) (criticizing the image of the injunction in One View of
the Cathedral), https://ssrn.comlabstract=304 1719 [https://perma.cc/4QJR-QRGQ].
298 See Bush v. Gaffney, 84 S.W.2d 759, 764 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
299 See, for example, the discussion of equity's traditional emphasis on the defendant in Richard
Hedlund, The Theological Foundations of Equity's Conscience, 4 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION I19,
124-26 (2015).
3oo On this understanding of the equitable maxims, see Bray, supra note 140, at 584-86. On the
equitable maxims generally, see R.P. MEAGHER, W.M.C. GUMMOw & J.R.F. LEHANE, EQUITY:
DOCTRINES AND REMEDIES 71-100 (3d ed. 1992); and Roger Young & Stephen Spitz, Essay,
SUEM - Spitz's Ultimate Equitable Maxim: In Equity, Good Guys Should Win and Bad Guys
Should Lose, 55 S.C. L. REV. 175 (2003).
301 When questioning the use of injunctions to benefit nonparties, Laycock has pointed to some
cases that might be thought to limit the use of national injunctions. See LAYCOCK, supra note 6,
at 275-76. These limits are doubtful. It is true that in Horne v. Flores, for example, the Supreme
Court urged the district court not to give a statewide injunction on remand but instead to give an
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V. WHERE SHOULD WE GO FROM HERE?
The status quo on national injunctions is not a very good translation
of traditional equity. The injunction retains its potency, but without the
institutional facts that made it intelligible to have such a concentration
of powers in the hands of a single judge. These powers remain concen-
trated but are now duplicated (one judge has them, and another, and
another, and so on). Moreover, older notions about challenges to invalid
laws have lost force, and practices of restraint have broken down. Some
compensating adjustments in the translation are needed. This Part pro-
poses a solution, a rule for the scope of injunctions against federal de-
fendants. This rule should be articulated by the federal courts, for the
federal courts themselves should recognize the limits on their authority,
instead of being required to do so by Congress. If the federal courts do
not, however, the rule should be enacted by statute.
A. Injunctions Should Be Plaintiff Protective
Given that national injunctions are problematic, and that the exist-
ing doctrine is inadequate, what can be done? Let's begin with a simple
rule: injunctions should not protect nonparties. Of course, in many cases
involving federal law there will need to be some sort of injunction, so
the simple rule can be specified a little further:
A federal court should give an injunction that protects the plaintiff vis-
A-vis the defendant, wherever the plaintiff and the defendant may both hap-
pen to be. The injunction should not constrain the defendant's conduct vis-
a-vis nonparties.
A rule of thumb for carrying this proposition into effect might be
that an injunction should be no broader than what the plaintiffs - not
in any kind of representative capacity, but solely for themselves -
should logically be able to bring contempt proceedings to enforce.
How would this work in practice? When a plaintiff sues to restrain
the enforcement of a federal statute, regulation, or order, and wins, the
national government will be unable to enforce the challenged law as to
the plaintiff. Depending on the number of plaintiffs and their identity,
the result might be broad but still partial nonenforcement.
injunction tailored to the plaintiffs. 557 U.S. 433, 470-72 (2009). Even so, the Court included an
exception that may swallow the rule: "[T]he District Court should vacate the injunction insofar as
it extends beyond Nogales unless the court concludes that Arizona is violating the [federal act in
question] on a statewide basis." Id. at 472 (emphasis added). Another optimistic view of the current
doctrine can be found in Josh Blackman & Howard M. Wasserman, The Process ofMarriage Equal-
ity, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 243, 250 (2056), which sharply distinguishes injunctions and prec-
edent, and asserts that only precedent affects nonparties. That assertion requires qualification,
given the muddle of the existing cases. See supra section I.B, PP. 461-62.
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For example, in Texas v. United States there were twenty-six state
plaintiffs.3 0 2 The states sued in their own capacity, alleging that they
would suffer injuries such as financial costs from issuing drivers' li-
censes on the basis of the federal grant of lawful presence.30 3 A more
sound injunction would have prohibited the federal government from
enforcing its statutes and regulations so as to require the states to grant
drivers' licenses on the basis of the federally granted lawful presence.
Beyond their alleged injuries, the states had no basis for securing a rem-
edy from the court. All other states - and even private parties within
the geographic borders of the twenty-six plaintiff states - had no claim
to an injunction against the Obama Administration's immigration
policy. .
Or consider the case of President Trump's initial executive order re-
stricting entry to the United States by individuals from seven nations.3 0 4
For an individual litigant seeking entry to the United States, a successful
challenge should bring an injunction forbidding the officers of the
United States from denying him or her that entry. A federal court should
not award that litigant a national injunction controlling the govern-
ment's conduct toward those who are not parties before the court.
In Washington v. Trump, the plaintiffs who obtained the preliminary
injunction were the states of Washington and Minnesota.3 05  Although
the states alleged various kinds of injury, in denying a stay the Ninth
Circuit relied on the states' strongest claim of irreparable injury, namely,
their claim on behalf of students and faculty affiliated with their state
universities who would be injured by denial of entry to and departure
from the United States.306  That basis for the preliminary injunction
points the way to its proper scope.3 0 The injunction should have re-
strained the federal government from enforcing the executive order
against students and faculty affiliated with the state universities of
Washington and Minnesota.3 08
302 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 604 (S.D. Tex.), aff'd, 809 F3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2056) (mem.).
303 Id. at 616-17.
304 See supra p. 459.
305 See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 111, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
306 Id. at 1168-69.
307 The Ninth Circuit declined to reach the states' other arguments for standing. Id. at II61 n.5.
Most of the alleged injuries are claims to parens patriae standing, which the Supreme Court rejected
in Frothingham, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923). See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL.,
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 283-86 (7th
ed. 2015) (discussing subsequent cases and qualifications).
308 Accord Aziz v. 'hump, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724, 738-39 (E.D. Va. 2017) (issuing a narrower in-
junction). The Ninth Circuit offered no affirmative argument for the national injunction, instead
suggesting that the government had failed to show the legality of a "fragmented immigration policy,"
Washington v. Trump, 847 F 3 d at ir66, and failed to propose "a workable alternative," id. at 1167.
These are familiar but unpersuasive arguments for a national injunction. See infra sections V.B.2,
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In short, no matter whether the challenge is to the immigration pol-
icy of the Obama Administration or the Trump Administration, the
courts should issue injunctions that protect the plaintiffs, not injunctions
that protect nonparties.
To be sure, an injunction need not be a mere prohibition. An equi-
table remedy is flexible, and its scope is not automatic. The court can
impose additional requirements on the defendant to ensure the plain-
tiff's rights are adequately protected, especially where the defendant has
shown a propensity to disregard those rights. But there should be no
term or breadth that is for the protection of nonparties rather than for
the protection of the plaintiff.
The basis for the rule advanced here is twofold.
First, Article III of the Constitution of the United States confers the
"judicial Power."309 This is a power to decide a case for a particular
claimant. Indeed, "all challenges to statutes arise when a particular lit-
igant claims that a statute cannot be enforced against her."3 10 This
claimant-focused understanding of the judicial power has implications
not only for who can sue in federal court, but also for what remedies the
federal courts have authority to give. On this understanding, Article III
defines the judicial role as "redress[ing] an injury resulting from a spe-
cific dispute." 11 Once a federal court has given an appropriate remedy
to the plaintiffs, there is no longer any case or controversy left for the
court to resolve. The parties have had their case or controversy re-
solved. There is no other. The court has no constitutional basis to de-
cide disputes and issue remedies for those who are not parties.312
P. 476, and VB.4 , PP. 478-79. On litigant arguments and the scope of an injunction, see supra note
140 and accompanying text.
309 U.S. CONST., art. III, § i ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.").
310 Fallon, supra note 196, at 1324; cf Aaron-Andrew P Bruhl, One Good PlaintiffIs Not Enough,
67 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (critiquing the idea that standing needs to be established by only
one of several plaintiffs), https://ssrn.com/abstract=290II22 [https://perma.cc/KL72-G8RJ].
311 Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 132 (20II); see also Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) ("It is the role of courts to provide relief to claimants, in individual or class
actions, who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm; it is not the role of courts, but
that of the political branches, to shape the institutions of government in such fashion as to comply
with the laws and the Constitution."); Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of
the Supreme Court at October Term, 1934, 49 HARV. L. REV. 68, 103 (1935) (arguing that the
Constitution made "the existence of a controversy between parties before the Court, and the neces-
sity of resolving it, . . . the avowed and exclusive basis of the power of judicial review"). There
are other understandings of Article III that emphasize judicial declaration of the law. See, e.g.,
Monaghan, supra note 203, at 1365-71.
312 See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 74 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The rationale
for our power to review federal legislation for constitutionality . . . only extends so far as to require
us to determine that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to this party, in the circumstances of
this case."); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) ("The Art. III judicial power exists only to
redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party, even though the court's
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Nor can this conclusion be avoided by saying that the limits of
ArticlelI1 control "standing" but not "remedies." In decision after deci-
sion, the Supreme Court has understood Article III as giving shape and
definition to the remedial authority of the federal courts.3 13  Many of
these cases have involved equitable remedies, with the Court insisting
that the plaintiff show standing that is specifically correlated with the
requested injunction.3 14 This intertwining of who can sue and what a
court is willing to do on that person's behalf is supported by good rea-
sons. Equitable remedies tend to be more costly and more vulnerable
to abuse by the parties.3 15 They invite, and sometimes require, the court
to manage the parties - and when one of those parties is, in effect,
another branch of the national government or a state, concerns about
separation of powers or federalism are heightened.3 1 6
In short, Article III gives the judiciary authority to resolve the dis-
putes of the litigants, not the disputes of others. Article III gives the
judiciary authority to remedy the wrongs done to those litigants, not the
wrongs done to others.
judgment may benefit others collaterally."); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 318 F.
Supp. 786, 793 (W.D.N.C. 1970) ("The orders of this court have been confined to the only area they
can properly embrace, and that is the rights of the particular parties represented in this case, on the
particular facts and history of this case."); see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493
(2009) (rejecting on Article III grounds the argument that "when a plaintiff has sued to challenge
the lawfulness of certain action or threatened action but has settled that suit, he retains standing to
challenge the basis for that action . .. apart from any concrete application that threatens imminent
harm to his interests").
313 See, e.g., Summers, 555 U.S. at 492-93; Lewis, 518 U.S. 343; City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95 (1983); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S.
227 (1937); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70 (1927); Frothingham, 262 U.S. 447 (1923);
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); cf. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 1 36 S. Ct. 1036,
,053 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) ("Article III does not give federal courts the power to order
relief to any uninjured plaintiff, class action or not.").
314 E.g., Summers, 555 U.S. at 493; Lewis, 518 U.S. at 357; Lyons, 461 U.S. at 103-06, 1o, III-
13. There are many older examples intertwining what would now be called standing and the ap-
propriateness of equitable relief. See, e.g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 50 (1867)
("[Tihis court has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official
duties . . . ."); Jacob Hoffman Brewing Co. v. McElligott, 259 F. 525, 531 (2d Cir. 1919) ("The right
to maintain the suits, i.e., to give the injunctive relief prayed for . . . "). How exactly to characterize
this connection between "standing" and "remedy" is not always clear. See FALLON ET AL., supra
note 307, at 232-34.
315 See Bray, supra note 140, at 572-78. On "equitable ripeness" as one of the equitable con-
straints, see id. at 549 & n.85.
316 In addition to these present, functional reasons for the likely remedy to inform standing, there
is a reason grounded in history. At law, each of the forms of action was a bundle of what we would
now call standing, merits, and remedies. Equity did not have the same sharply defined bundles.
The equitable remedies could be complex, time consuming, and expensive, and there was only one
Chancellor. Thus equity could not have a policy that once a plaintiff had passed some threshold
of "standing," any equitable remedy, no matter how involved, would be available. Instead the
Chancellor would look forward to the remedy in considering "equitable jurisdiction," a concept that
overlapped with what we would now call "standing" or "cause of action."
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A second basis is the Judiciary Act of 1789,317 which has been inter-
preted as requiring the federal courts to trace their equitable doctrines
to traditional equity.3 18 The rule advanced here can be supported by
equitable principles, with the caveat that traditional equity needs to be
translated for present-day institutions.
In the practice of traditional equity, injunctions did not control the
defendant's behavior against nonparties. To that extent, the proposed
rule carries over the traditional practice. Yet equity never condensed its
practice into a sharply defined rule like the one advanced here. It never
needed to. With only one Chancellor, and with a modest conception of
what equitable relief was supposed to do, traditional equity did not need
to develop rules to constrain the scope of injunctions. Indeed, even the
equitable practices and principles that might seem to support national
injunctions - such as the bill of peace3 19 and the extraterritorial force
of equitable decrees320 - do not really do so once the facts of one
Chancellor and equitable restraint are taken into account. This rule is
a close translation of traditional equity into the present, with sensitivity
to institutional and ideological changes.3 21
B. Objections
Against this rule at least five objections can be raised: one about
differential treatment, two about complex regulatory systems, one about
hard-to-detect plaintiffs, and one about the choice of a rule over a stand-
ard. Working through them will show the contours and the limits of the
rule.
i. Differential Treatment. - The first objection is that the successful
plaintiff will be treated differently from others. This objection can be
317 Ch. 20, i Stat. 73.
318 See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318-19 (1999)
(describing the equitable remedial authority of the federal courts as "an authority to administer in
equity suits the principles of the system of judicial remedies which had been devised and was being
administered by the English Court of Chancery at the time of the separation of the two countries,"
id. at 318 (quoting Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 (1939))). For schol-
arship on traditional equity and the federal courts, see supra note 13.
319 See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
320 See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 289 (1952) ("[Tjhe District Court in exercising
its equity powers may command persons properly before it to cease or perform acts outside its
territorial jurisdiction.'); New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473, 482 (1931) ("The situs of
the acts creating the nuisance, whether within or without the United States, is of no importance.
Plaintiff seeks a decree in personam to prevent them in the future."); Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S.
107, 116-21 (1890) (reviewing English and American cases); Massie v. Watts, io U.S. (6 Cranch)
148, 158 (i8yo) ("[T]he principles of equity give a court jurisdiction wherever the person may be
found . .. ."); 2 STORY, supra note 39, § 899, at 230-32, 230 n.I, §§ 1290-1300, at 723-29. For
further discussion, see supra note i9.
321 For further discussion of translating equity for the present, see Bray, supra note 26.
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put in the language of treating like cases alike, or of equality, or of the
rule of law.3 2 2 In each guise the point is the same.
One answer is that the differential treatment is grounded in differ-
ential actions. Because the plaintiff is the one who took the initiative
and sued, it is the plaintiff who is protected. Others can receive the
same protection if they take the same action by bringing their own suits
(invoking the authority of the earlier decision).323
More generally, the evaluation should be made in light of the broader
disuniformity in the law. In our system of courts - both federal and
state, and with the federal courts divided among circuits - the choice
has been made to allow some disuniformity. The only way to avoid it
entirely is to have a single court for the United States. Failing that, the
next closest thing would be to have lots of courts and allow whichever
one took the case first to decide it for the nation.3 2 4 Once we are com-
mitted to seeking only eventual uniformity, then it is not a knock-out
objection that the rule advanced here allows for disuniformity.
The question should be about the right moment to achieve uni-
formity - at what point should the uncertainty be liquidated, by what
legal actor, and in what posture? With the question posed that way, it
is impossible to think the best legal actor is a single district judge se-
lected through forum shopping. Nor is the best posture a decision by
the Supreme Court on a motion to stay the preliminary injunction issued
by a district court selected thus. The better way to resolve the question
is either through the unanimous alignment of lower courts or through
disagreement among the lower courts followed by a series of decisions
by the Supreme Court. In other words, the way to resolve legal ques-
tions for nonparties is through precedent, not through injunctions.
Precedent should be the ordinary way one case ripples out to oth-
ers.3 2 5 What that means, in practical terms, is that a single plaintiff can
win an injunction that protects her from the enforcement of a statute,
regulation, or order. When the government appeals, if the appellate
court affirms, its decision is a precedent within the circuit. There is no
322 See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 6, at 2033 ("When a court determines that the defendant's un-
lawful conduct is harming a large number of people, but orders the defendant o cease that conduct
only as to one (or a handful) of them, allowing the violation to continue undermines the rule of
law."); Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 6, at 490 (referring to "the unfairness that could
result from enforcing certain plaintiffs' rights while allowing the challenged provision to otherwise
remain in effect, violating the rights of others").
323 For this point and its pithy expression, I thank Douglas Laycock.
324 For a vivid cautionary tale, see Thomas 0. McGarity, Multi-Party Forum Shopping for Ap-
pellate Review of Administrative Action, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 302, 320-22 (1980).




need for dozens of other suits in the circuit; the law of the circuit can be
settled promptly, and can then be applied to every new plaintiff. 3 26
At this point, the depth and durability of the legal uncertainty de-
pend on the actions of the national government, of other circuits, and of
the Supreme Court. Current research suggests that when circuit splits
emerge, they tend to emerge quickly.3 2 7 That is, when one circuit de-
cides a question, if a circuit split is likely to emerge, it will emerge in the
next one or two circuits to consider the question - not after half a dozen
circuits have agreed about the resolution. If there is disagreement
among the circuits, the likelihood is high that the Supreme Court will
take the case and resolve the circuit split.328 In the meantime, each
circuit's precedents apply only in that circuit.3 2 9
Such disagreement is not merely tolerable; it is good. The possibility
that the federal government would apply a rule in some circuits but not
others was blessed in United States v. Mendoza,330 the decision holding
that nonmutual offensive issue preclusion does not apply against the
United States. The Court said:
A rule allowing nonmutual collateral estoppel against the Government in
such cases would substantially thwart the development of important ques-
tions of law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal
issue. Allowing only one final adjudication would deprive this Court of the
benefit it receives from permitting several courts of appeals to explore a
difficult question before this Court grants certiorari. Indeed, if nonmutual
estoppel were routinely applied against the Government, this Court would
have to revise its practice of waiting for a conflict to develop before granting
the Government's petitions for certiorari.3 31
Admittedly, there may be cases in which an injunction protecting
only the plaintiff proves too narrow. But in such cases there is an obvi-
ous answer: a class action. Nothing about the analysis here precludes a
Rule 23(b)(2) class action (that is, a class action for injunctive or declar-
atory relief). Indeed, if federal courts were to end the practice of issuing
national injunctions, and instead were to issue only plaintiff-protective
326 If the government does not appeal, the district court is likely to sustain as many challenges as
are brought before it. The government may need to appeal somewhere, sooner rather than later, to
stop the losses.
327 Deborah Beim & Kelly Rader, Evolution of Conflict in the Courts of Appeals (Apr. I, 2056)
(unpublished manuscript), https://campuspress.yale.edufbeim/files/2oi6/og/BeimRaderConflicts
Princeton2o6-293m9zr.pdf [https://perma.cc/4T9G-SQJ2].
328 STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 4.4, at 243-50 (loth ed. 2013).
329 E.g., Right to Life of Dutchess Cty., Inc. v. FEC, 6 F Supp. 2d 248, 252-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1998);
see also Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d iii9, 1122-24 (7th Cir. 1987). A possible further impli-
cation, if the trend toward state-initiated litigation continues, is that states could succeed in chal-
lenging national regulations even while those regulations remained enforceable in the District of
Columbia, which would then be a site of experimentation for federal regulatory policy.
330 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
331 Id. at 16o (citations omitted).
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injunctions, it would become easier to see the rationale for the Rule
2 3 (b)(2) class action as a means of achieving broad injunctive relief.
33 2
It is true that the requirements for a class action will not always be
easy to meet. For example, the interests of the potential class may vary.
The class might need to be a narrower and more cohesive subgroup -
not everyone affected by the executive order restricting entry from seven
countries, but all travel agents, for example. Yet the difficulty of fitting
a case into the classic form of a class action is a reason to favor individ-
ual suits, not a reason to circumvent class requirements and jump
straight to giving what is in effect class-wide relief.
In short, there is already ample disuniformity. It is intrinsic in hav-
ing multiple federal courts, in having a federal system, and for that mat-
ter in having a large country. What changes, with the rule proposed
here, is a shift in how (and how quickly) that disuniformity is resolved.
It is resolved not through the single thunderbolt of a national injunction,
but through the steady accumulation of precedent throughout the sys-
tem of federal courts.
2. Regulatory Disruption. - A second objection is that a plaintiff-
protective injunction, as opposed to a national injunction, would disrupt
complex regulatory systems. Put more colloquially, regulation should
not be piecemeal, but it would be piecemeal if the court gave one plain-
tiff a get-out-of-jail-free card. This point can be disposed of more
quickly. Agencies are likely to prefer narrow injunctions to national
injunctions. If the agency wants to respond to a narrower injunction by
adopting the district court's resolution as a rule for the nation, it can do
so. If the agency wants to keep its regulation, however, it can. If an
appellate court affirms the ruling against the agency, thus setting circuit
precedent, the agency can continue to enforce its rule in the other cir-
cuits. Again the scenario is not a nightmare: it was expressly contem-
plated and endorsed by United States v. Mendoza.
3. Regulatory Entrenchment. - The regulatory-disruption objection
is about inconsistency at a particular moment. A stronger objection can
be made about unwarranted consistency over time. Once a complex
regulatory system goes into effect, the changes in behavior by adminis-
trative agencies and regulated entities may be effectively irreversible.
Is an agency's bet on path dependence a reason to grant national
injunctions?
This is perhaps the strongest case for a national injunction.333 There
is no reason to respect an agency's preference for - even delight at the
332 For a discussion of the difficulty in justifying the Rule 2 3 (b)(2) Class action if the same relief
is available to an individual litigant, see supra note 279 and accompanying text. On the Rule 23(b)(2)
class action, see generally Carroll, supra note 6; and Marcus, supra note 222.
333 This case for national injunctions is strongest for preliminary injunctions, because they pre-
serve the status quo in the sense of ensuring that the plaintiff is not irreparably injured before
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prospect of - losing individual battles, yet having already won the war
because the policy change was irreversible. That agencies take this view
is not hypothetical.334 Concern about this kind of path dependence may
have driven the Supreme Court's highly unusual stay pending disposi-
tion in a challenge to the Obama Administration's Clean Power Plan.3 3 s
In short, to prevent individual litigants from winning only Pyrrhic vic-
tories, some kind of broad relief seems necessary before a regulatory
scheme goes into effect:
The problem is real, but a national injunction is a crude solution.
We cannot count on- judicial willingness to give national injunctions to
be a good filter for those regulations that are hardest or most costly to
reverse. This is especially true given the forum shopping endemic to
suits seeking national injunctions. And given the unfortunately mori-
bund state of injunction bonds3 3 6 in federal courts, litigants have every
reason to seek national preliminary injunctions against all regulatory
initiatives, reversible or irreversible.
The better solution is legislative. Congress could enact a require-
ment that certain regulations be delayed for a period of time long enough
to allow challenges to be brought and circuit precedent to be made.3 37
Or Congress could expressly require that "major rules" receive congres-
sional approval3 38 or be subject to heightened procedures.3 3 9 Or, more
judgment and the court is not robbed of its ability to decide the case. See Univ. of Tex. v. Came-
nisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (i981); Centaur Co. v. Marshall, 97 F. 785, 786 (8th Cir. 1899) ("The purpose
of a preliminary injunction is to prevent irremediable injury to some of the parties to the suit during
its pendency, and before their claims can be investigated and adjudicated.").
334 After losing a case in the Supreme Court on its Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, the EPA
described the Court's decision as having minimal effect because "the majority of power plants are
already in compliance or well on their way to compliance." Janet McCabe, In Perspective: The
Supreme Court's Mercury and Air Toxics Rule Decision, EPA BLOG (June 30, 2015),
https://blog.epa.gov/blog/20I5/o6/in-perspective-the-supreme-courts-mercury-and-air-toxics-rule-
decision/ [https://perma.cc/D9NK-CNBB].
335 See Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 999 (2o6).
336 On injunction bonds and the supposed discretion that federal courts have not to require them,
see generally i DOBBS, supra note 21, § 2.11(3), at 267-70; and LAYCOCK, supra note 6, at 453-56.
337 For one such proposal, see H.R. 5, 115th Cong. (2017). Title IV, entitled the "Require Evalu-
ation Before Implementing Executive Wishlists Act," would require such a delay for regulations
with an annual cost of over one billion dollars. Id. § 402.
338 See, e.g., H.R. 26, ii5th Cong. (2017) (requiring congressional approval for certain regula-
tions, including those with projected annual costs of over one hundred million dollars).
339 See, e.g., S. 951, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 5 tit. i, us5th Cong. ("Regulatory Accountability
Act"). For further discussion, see Christopher J. Walker, Essay, Modernizing the Administrative
Procedure Act, 69 ADMIN. L. REv. 629, 656-62 (2017), as well as the diverging evaluations in As-
sessing the Regulatory Accountability Act, REG. REV. (May 30, 2017), https://www.theregreview.
org/2017/05/30/assessing-regulatory-accountability-act/ [h tps://perma.cc/RDR6-7FZ6]. For judi-
cial discussion of the "major questions" or "major rules" doctrine, which could be codified, see
United States Telecom Association v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 402-04 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Brown,
J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc); and id. at 418-24 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
from the denial of rehearing en banc).
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radically, Congress could push agencies toward making policy not pri-
marily through rules but through adjudications, in accord with what
seems to have been the design of the Administrative Procedure Act. 3 4 0
4. Plaintiff Detection. - Another objection is that in some cases it
would be impractical to have an injunction benefitting only the plaintiff,
because it may be hard for the federal defendant to distinguish the plain-
tiff from other persons. The classic case on this question involves an in-
junction not against a federal agency but against the California Highway
Patrol.341 The plaintiffs were "Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T.," an un-
incorporated association of motorcyclists, and fourteen individual motor-
cyclists. The case involved the California Highway Patrol's aggressive
enforcement of a state motorcycle helmet law, and in particular the stop-
ping of motorcyclists who were not actually in violation of the helmet law
(because the motorcyclists lacked subjective knowledge that their hel-
mets were out of compliance with federal safety standards).342 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the holding that stopping the motorcyclists was a Fourth
Amendment violation, and it also affirmed the injunction protecting all
motorcyclists, not just the plaintiffs.3 4 3 Its analysis here has influenced a
number of subsequent courts, and the key passage is worth quoting:
While there are only fourteen named plaintiffs in this case, spread among
San Diego, Orange, Los Angeles, and Ventura counties, and an unknown
number of members of Easyriders, an injunction against the CHP [Califor-
nia Highway Patrol] statewide is appropriate. Because the CHP policy re-
garding helmets is formulated on a statewide level, other law enforcement
agencies follow the CHP's policy, and it is unlikely that law enforcement
officials who were not restricted by an injunction governing their treatment
of all motorcyclists would inquire before citation into whether a motorcyclist
was among the named plaintiffs or a member of Easyriders, the plaintiffs
would not receive the complete relief to which they are entitled without
statewide application of the injunction.3 4 4
Here the court advanced two reasons for the injunction protecting
nonparties: the California Highway Patrol's policy was statewide, and
officers did not know which motorcyclists on California roads were
plaintiffs in the case (either individually or as members of Easyriders).
The first reason has already been discussed above and should be re-
jected.3 45 The second is more interesting, and it has been noted uncrit-
340 See generally Schiller, supra note 121.
341 Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 E3d 1486 (9 th Cir. 1996).
342 See id. at 1492.
343 Id. at 50I-02.
344 Id. at Y502.
345 See supra Part IV, pp. 465-68 (discussing complete-relief principle).
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ically by commentators, including some who are generally skeptical of
national injunctions.3 4 6
Nevertheless, there are two good reasons not to make an exception
in a case like Easyriders Freedom FI.G.H.T v. Hannigan,47 and instead
to stick to the general rule that an injunction should protect only the
plaintiffs.
First, an Easyriders exception allows for the circumvention of the
general rule. If organizations with numerous members can get national
injunctions, then a rule against national injunctions can be evaded with
artful selection or construction of plaintiffs.
Second, the difficulty for the defendant is overstated. The key is that
if the court gives a plaintiff-protective injunction, the burden is on the
defendant to figure out how to comply. In the Easyriders case the court
made this assumption: "[I]t is unlikely that law enforcement officials
who were not restricted by an injunction governing their treatment of
all motorcyclists would inquire before citation into whether a motorcy-
clist was among the named plaintiffs or a member of Easyriders." 34
But why is it unlikely? If the court issues an injunction protecting the
plaintiffs, and stresses the certainty of contempt enforcement for any
violations, why wouldn't the California Highway Patrol require officers
to make exactly that inquiry? Or why couldn't the California Highway
Patrol decide on a more creative option, such as distributing decals to
the Easyriders? And if the California Highway Patrol makes the con-
sidered judgment that it would rather extend to all motorcyclists the
protections in the court's injunction, why is that a problem? The court
does not need to make the choice for the government defendant.3 4 9
5. A Standard, Not a Rule. - There are competing policy consider-
ations in the choice between a plaintiff-protective injunction and a na-
tional injunction. On the one hand, a plaintiff-protective injunction has
advantages with respect to forum shopping, percolation, and conflicting
injunctions. On the other hand, there are policy concerns that in some
circumstances favor a national injunction. These include concerns
about the executive branch's continuing to enforce unconstitutional stat-
utes and unlawful regulations, inequality in the administration of the
law, and administrability.
346 See LAYCOCK, supra note 6, at 276; David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 04
GEO. L.J. 777, Soo-oi (2o6).
347 92 F.3d 1486.
348 Id. at o502.
349 Accord Zepeda v. INS, 753 F2d 719, 729 n.I (9th Cir. 1983) ("The individual plaintiffs need
not take any action to identify themselves to make it easy for the INS to comply with the injunction.
Rather, the burden is on the INS to comply .... ). Note that phasing in the injunction can allow
the defendant time to work out a method for complying (where the defendant has not proved re-
calcitrant). If a plaintiff-protective injunction really is hopelessly impractical, that will sometimes
be a reason not to give an injunction.
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These countervailing policy considerations seem to invite the use of
a standard, not a rule.3 5 0 A standard would offer a middle ground be-
tween two opposite rules: a rule that says every injunction restraining
the enforcement of a federal law should be a national injunction, and
the rule proposed here (that is, no national injunctions). If we set aside
the questions of positive law3 5 and coherence with other legal rules and
practices35 2 and merely ask a direct policy question, why is the proposal
here a rule and not a standard?
The answer lies in the domain of the second best. Although in theory
a standard would allow for the possibility of national injunctions in ap-
propriate situations,3 53 in practice the use of a standard would be seri-
ously deficient. The initial problem is that it seems inevitable that any
standard for when national injunctions should issue would be highly
indeterminate. Existing doctrine already contains such a standard: the
complete-relief requirement. This standard should ideally offer a mid-
dle ground - national injunctions when necessary for complete relief,
but no national injunctions when unnecessary for complete relief. But
the middle position is not stable. Whenever a plaintiff challenges a fed-
eral statute, regulation, or order, the complete-relief principle allows the
judge to award or not award a national injunction without any real
limitations - it is almost wholly indeterminate.35 4 Other standards that
might be proposed, such as the value of uniformity or the importance of
the right, are also highly indeterminate. Remember, too, that any stand-
ard would also be applied to grants of preliminary injunctions, a point
at which there has been no trial, with only a judicial surmise about the
relevant policy considerations.
Related to the indeterminacy of a standard for injunctions are two
further problems. First, the standard would be applied by a district
judge selected through forum shopping. Second, that district judge's
application of the standard would be reviewed only for abuse of discre-
tion. Indeed, the forum shopping extends not only to the district court
but also to the court of appeals. Thus, the problem with a standard can
be stated starkly: a district court selected through forum shopping will
apply a relatively indeterminate standard, which will then be leniently
reviewed by a court of appeals also selected through forum shopping.
(These arguments against astandard would also hold against a rebutta-
ble presumption, either for or against a national injunction.)
350 I am grateful to Bob Bone for raising this objection.
351 That is, whether a proposed legal norm has a basis in existing constitutional law, statutory
law, or judicial decisions. On the basis for the rule proposed here, see supra notes 2-9 and accom-
panying text.
352 See supra section M.D, pp. 464-65.
3s3 One example is the preliminary injunction in Youngstown. See supra note 96 and accompa-
nying text.
354 See supra Part IV, pp. 465-68.
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In short, the rule advanced here does not capture all of the competing
policy considerations. But for the system of federal courts as it actually
exists, this rule is an achievable second best. It is superior as a matter
of policy to a standard such as complete relief.
CONCLUSION
The national injunction has a distortive effect on the decisionmaking
of the federal courts and on the enactment and enforcement of law in
the United States. A reader could have started with Part III and been
convinced of this point, and then skipped to Part V and found the cure.
If read that way, the Article has a pleasing sense of finality. The problem
would appear isolated, an irrational irruption. It would be solved.
The complexity and depth of the problem come into view, however,
once its historical and institutional aspects are recognized. The national
injunction is a relatively new innovation, without any basis in tradi-
tional equity. What makes it problematic is a structural shift that hap-
pened when the federal courts were first established: the shift from the
one-chancellor model of the English Chancery to the multiple-chancellor
model of the federal courts.
For the federal courts, there is no going back to a one-chancellor
model. Nor will the ideological changes that permitted the national in-
junction soon fade away. Yet it is valuable to understand where the
national injunction came from, because having this understanding en-
courages us not to think that the solution is exhorting judges to behave
better. This understanding also helps us think more carefully about the
"traditional equity" that the federal courts look to when fashioning the
principles of equity in the present. Traditional equitable doctrines were
developed in a one-chancellor system. Equitable powers do not work
the same way when the institutional setting changes dramatically; they
cannot be carried over, all intact, to the present. A translation has to be
made, and translation is a practice marked not only by fidelity but also
by subtlety and creativity.35 5
It is possible, in a sense, to solve the problem of the national injunc-
tion. But the national injunction is intimately connected to another,
deeper problem, namely, the speed at which legal questions are an-
swered. Imagine that legal questions were resolved quickly, comprehen-
sively, and with immediate finality. That system would be criticized as
rash, perhaps even as an illegitimate exercise of authority. Imagine, by
contrast, that legal questions were resolved slowly, piecemeal, and with
a resolution that was only eventually final. That system would also be




open to criticism. For one person it might offer justice, but for others it
might offer only justice delayed or outright denied.
This choice is a deep problem that will never be solved.3 5 6 Each
legal system can pick its poison, tending toward the vices of immediate,
final resolution or the vices of slow, provisional resolution. In this re-
gard, there is a sharp contrast between the English Chancery and the
federal courts. A medieval Chancellor spoke on behalf of God and King;
an early modern Chancellor spoke on behalf of conscience and King.
These claims of epistemic certainty and political authority fit hand-in-
ermine-lined-glove with the existence of a single Chancellor. But the
authority of federal judges is different. Power in the American political
system is pervasively divided - through federalism, through the sepa-
ration of powers, and through the sprawling system of federal courts. A
legal question is resolved through patience and the consideration of
many minds. Which system is better, if starting from scratch, is a diffi-
cult question. The question of which system obtains in the United States
is easy to answer: a fragmented, many-minds system. In a system like
ours, there is no room for the national injunction.
356 See EDWARD SHILS, TRADITION 323 (ig8) ("There is no permanent solution to any im-
portant problem in human life. Only transient and minor problems have solutions .. ").
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